AES-CMCC v1.1

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Chapter 1

Specification

1.1 Parameters

AES-CMCC v1 has the following parameters:

1. Stateful or stateless
2. Key size: 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits.
3. Authentication Tag Length: 0 bytes up to 16 bytes.
4. Secret Message Number (SMN) length (stateful only): 16 bytes
5. Stateful scheme ciphertext expansion: 0-8 bytes
6. Public Message Number (PMN) length (stateless only: 0-16 bytes)
7. The MAC algorithm for computing V (see Section 1.3) can be any MAC algorithm with the standard MAC security property (forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack), except that if it takes a nonce as one of its input parameters, the MAC algorithm must be misuse resistant when a nonce is reused. [1]

Each parameter is an integer number of bytes.

1.2 Recommended Parameter Sets

All recommended parameter sets have 128 bit keys, and the MAC algorithm for computing V is AES-CMAC.[2] All stateful versions have a 16 byte SMN.

(1) Stateless: Authentication tag length 8 bytes, PMN length 4 bytes.
(2) Stateless: Authentication tag length 4 bytes, PMN length 4 bytes.
(3) Stateless: Authentication tag length 4 bytes, PMN length 2 bytes.

[1] This MAC algorithm is used as part of the encryption process and does not produce the authentication tag in the 3rd parameter above. The authentication tag is a string of zero bits.

[2] NIST Special Publication 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication

(4) Stateless: Authentication tag length 2 bytes, PMN length 4 bytes.
(5) Stateless: Authentication tag length 2 bytes, PMN length 2 bytes.

We have not recommended any stateful parameter sets since these would require a shared strategy for generating the private message numbers between the communication peers (e.g., increment by 1 starting at 0). The call for ciphers allows the caller to generate message numbers using any caller specific algorithm, so the caller algorithm may not be known to the communication peer.

1.3 Authenticated Encryption

1.3.1 CMCC Stateless Scheme

Notation

We use | to denote concatenation of strings, and $\oplus$ denotes bitwise xor. b^j is the bit b repeated j times. The notation $R_{128} = 0^{120}10000111$ denotes the bit string with 120 zero bits, followed by the bits 1,0,0,0,0,1,1, and 1. $x << n$ denotes the left shift operator (filling vacated bits with zero bits), after shifting the string x by n bits to the left. $|S|$ denotes the length of the string S. B denotes the block length of the underlying block cipher (AES for this specification). E_k denotes encryption using the block cipher and input key k.

$LSB_j(x)$ and $MSB_j(x)$ denote the j least significant bytes and j most significant bytes of byte string x respectively.

Padding

We will apply the padding scheme from the AES-CMAC algorithm to our mode when CBC encryption is performed. One difference is that we will sometimes need to pad by a full block length ($B/8$ bytes)[3] and we use the same padding scheme as when the padding is between 1 and $B/8 - 1$ bytes.

1. Given the CBC encryption key K, and byte strings S_1 and S_2, where $|S_1| \leq |S_2|$. We define $pad(S_1)_{S_2}$ as follows:

2. *pad_length* is the number of bits (which is a multiple of 8) needed to bring S_1 up to the length of S_2 and then bring S_1 up to a multiple of the block size. More formally,

$$pad\_length = |S_2| - |S_1| + B - (|S_2| \mod B)$$

   where mod values are taken between 1 and B.

3. We define $L = E_K(0^B)$. If the most significant bit of L is zero, then define $K1 = L << 1$, otherwise, we define $K1 = (L << 1) \oplus R_{128}$. If the most significant bit of $K1$ is zero, then define $K2 = K1 << 1$. Otherwise, we define $K2 = (K1 << 1) \oplus R_{128}$.

   If $pad\_length = 0$, then $|S_1|$ is a multiple of B; let F be the last block of S_1. We define $pad(S_1)_{S_2}$ to be S_1 with its last block replaced with $F \oplus K1$.

[3] If S_1 is a multiple of B and S_2 is one byte longer, than we pad S_1 with $B/8$ bytes. If both strings are the same length which is a multiple of B then we do not add any padding bytes.

If $1 \leq pad\_length \leq B$, then we append the following string to the last (possibly empty) block F of S_1 : $10^{pad\_length-1}$. $pad(S_1)_{S_2}$ is S_1 with the last block of S_1 replaced with $F|10^{pad\_length-1} \oplus K2$.

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 describe the stateless version of CMCC.

CMCC Mode - Encryption
$CBC(IV, P, Key)$ is CBC encryption with initialization vector IV, plaintext P, and key Key. $MAC(IV, P, Key)$ is MAC algorithm with output string of length $l/8$ bits (one block) with initialization vector IV, plaintext P, and key Key. $pad()$ is the padding algorithm defined in Section 1.3.1. $E_{\bar{K}}$ is the block cipher with key $\bar{K}$.

Encryption Inputs: plaintext P, key $K = \bar{K}, L_3, L_2, \bar{L}_2, L_1$, public message number N, and associated data A.

Given constant $0xb6 \ldots 0xb6$, (repeated 16 times), we take the $16 - |N|$ most significant bytes and prepend them to N to obtain M, where $|N|$ denotes the length of N in bytes.

Let Z be the bit string with τ zero bits (τ is the number of authentication bits).

Let $W = E_{\bar{K}}(M)$.

$Q = P|Z$.

Let $Q = P_1|P_2$ where $|P_1| = |P_2|$ or $|P_1| = |P_2| - 8$ (P_1 may be one byte shorter than P_2.)

$X = CBC(W, pad(P_1)_{P_2}, L_3) \oplus P_2$, X is truncated to the length of P_2.

$Y = X|A$
$V = MAC(W, Y, L_2)$,

$P_1 = \bar{P}_{1,1}| \ldots |\bar{P}_{1,i}|\bar{P}_{1,i+1}$ where $i \geq 0$, $\bar{P}_{1,1}, \ldots, \bar{P}_{1,i}$ are full blocks and $\bar{P}_{1,i+1}$ is a partial (possibly empty) block,

$X_2 = V \oplus \bar{P}_{1,1}|E_{\bar{L}_2}(V+1) \oplus \bar{P}_{1,2}| \ldots |E_{\bar{L}_2}(V+i) \oplus \bar{P}_{1,i+1}$.
($E_{\bar{L}_2}(V+j)$ is truncated to the length of $\bar{P}_{1,j+1}$ for $j \geq 1$, and bits 31,63 of V are zeroed for j=1.)

$X_1 = CBC(W, pad(X_2)_X, L_1) \oplus X$, X_1 is truncated to the length of X.

Ciphertext: X_1, X_2

Figure 1.1: CMCC Mode Encryption - Stateless Version

Decryption Inputs: X_1, X_2, M, A

$W = E_{\bar{K}}(M)$.

$X = CBC(W, pad(X_2)_{X_1}, L_1) \oplus X_1$

$Y = X|A$.
$V = MAC(W, Y, L_2)$

$X_2 = \bar{X}_{2,1}|\ldots|\bar{X}_{2,i}|\bar{X}_{2,i+1}$ where $i \geq 0$ and $\bar{X}_{2,1}, \ldots, \bar{X}_{2,i}$ are full blocks and $\bar{X}_{2,i+1}$ is a partial empty block, $P_1 = V \oplus \bar{X}_{2,1}|E_{\bar{L}_2}(V+1) \oplus \bar{X}_{2,2}|\ldots|E_{\bar{L}_2}(V+i) \oplus \bar{X}_{2,i+1}$

$P_2 = CBC(W, pad(P_1)_X, L_3) \oplus X$

$Q = P_1|P_2$

$U = LSB_{\tau/8}(Q)$

if $(U \; ! = Z)$, return $\perp$, otherwise $Q = \tilde{P}|Z$ and return **Plaintext** $\tilde{P}, M$

Figure 1.2: CMCC Mode Decryption - Stateless Version

Chapter 2

Security Goals

goal	aes-cmcc v1, 8 byte tag	aes-cmcc v1 4 byte tag	aes-cmcc v1, 2 byte tag
confidentiality for plaintext	128	128	128
integrity for plaintext	64	32	16
integrity for Assoc. Data	64	32	16
integrity for PMN	64	32	16

Table 2.1: Security goals: recommended parameters for stateless

Table 2.1 gives the security strengths for the recommended parameters for the stateless case, but the integrity strengths do not include higher layer checks that act as authentication bits. These checks are protocol specific. The numbers in the table do not account for the case where the attacker is able to obtain messages encrypted under the key - see below for bounds for this latter case.

The stateless case does not include a Secret Message Number (SMN). Although longer key lengths are possible (192 and 256 bits), the recommended key size for these parameter sets is 128 bits.

2.1 Additional Security Goals

In addition to authenticated encryption, CMCC has the following security goals:

1. The cipher is designed to provide the maximum possible robustness against message-number reuse, i.e., that the cipher maintains full integrity and confidentiality, except for leaking collisions of (plaintext,associated data,secret message number,public message number) via collisions of ciphertexts.

2. Ciphertext modification results in unpredictable changes to the plaintext; thus
   (a) modifications to a ciphertext will like cause a failure in higher level processing (resulting in session termination most likely)
   (b) data that is consumed immediately will be randomized and thus anomalous to the consuming agent, again causing alerts and/or session termination.

The implication of these properties is that, for many applications, the number of authentication bits that are part of the ciphertext can be reduced. The benefit is reduced network overhead.

3. Stateful version: private message numbers will hide the number of messages previously sent.

4. Stateful version: replay protection can be enforced by the receiver.

2.1.1 Resistance to Additional Specific Attacks

Here we discuss additional security features.

1. Large number of legitimate messages encrypted, ciphertexts decrypted: Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a bound on the maximum number of blocks in a query, μ is the total number of blocks in the adversary queries, and B is the cipher block length. CMCC encryption (stateless and stateful versions) is CCA2 MRAE secure for (ϵ, q) with

$$\epsilon = q(q-1)/2\alpha + q/\alpha + q^2/2^{B+2} + \sum_{i=1}^{3} Adv^{prf}_{f_i}(q) + Adv^{prf}_{E_{\bar{K}}}(q) +$$
$$\lceil |challenge\ ciphertext|/B \rceil \mu/2^B + \max\{q\mathcal{M}^2/2^B, z/\alpha + \mathcal{M}(q-z)/2^B\} + 2^{-\tau}$$

   given that the adversary is restricted to q queries, $\alpha = 2^m$ where $MinLen$ is the minimal bit length of the adversary queries and $m = \lfloor MinLen/2 \rfloor$, τ is the number of bits in the authentication tag, and $z \leq q$.

2. Relationships among keys and related key attacks: There are no key relationships (the keys are independent) and related key attacks are not a threat.

3. Software and Hardware Side Channels: Note that encryption and decryption are both performed using AES encryption (not decryption) and that padding is never checked (both encryptor and decryptor will pad but neither will verify any padding). So there is no padding oracle. The adversary cannot manipulate ciphertext to produce specific plaintext relations or patterns so the adversary cannot learn information about the plaintext or keys from integrity failures.

   Specific implementations may be vulnerable to side channels based on observable differences arising from distinct keys or plaintexts. Thus developers should consider methods for minimizing side channels in implementations.

Chapter 3

Security Analysis

3.1 Definitions

3.1.1 Pseudorandomness

The concatenation of two strings S and T is denoted by $S|T$, or S, T where there is no danger of confusion.

We write $w \leftarrow W$ to denote selecting an element w from the set W using the uniform distribution. We write $x \leftarrow f()$ to denote assigning the output of the function f, or algorithm f, to x.

Throughout the paper, the adversary is an algorithm which we denote as $\mathcal{A}$.

We follow [GGM86] as explained in [Shoup] for the definition of a pseudo-random function: Let l_1 and l_2 be positive integers, and let $\mathcal{F} = \{h_L\}_{L \in K}$ be a family of keyed functions where each function h_L maps $\{0,1\}^{l_1}$ into $\{0,1\}^{l_2}$. Let H_{l_1,l_2} denote the set of functions from $\{0,1\}^{l_1}$ to $\{0,1\}^{l_2}$.

Given an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ which has oracle access to a function in H_{l_1,l_2} or $\mathcal{F}$. The adversary will output a bit and attempt to distinguish between a function uniformly randomly selected from $\mathcal{F}$ and a function uniformly randomly selected from H_{l_1,l_2}. We define the PRF-advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ to be

$$Adv_{\mathcal{F}}^{prf}(\mathcal{A}) = |Pr[L \leftarrow K : \mathcal{A}^{h_L}() = 1] - Pr[f \leftarrow H_{l_1,l_2} : \mathcal{A}^{f}() = 1]|$$

$$Adv_{\mathcal{F}}^{prf}(q) = \max_{\mathcal{A}}\{Adv_{\mathcal{F}}^{prf}(\mathcal{A})\}$$

where the maximum is over adversaries that run with number of queries bounded by q.

Intuitively, $\mathcal{F}$ is pseudo-random if it is hard to distinguish a random function selected from $\mathcal{F}$ from a random function selected from H_{l_1,l_2}.

3.1.2 (Misuse Resistant) CCA Encryption

Given the symmetric key encryption scheme $S = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$. We define the CCA2 encryption experiment $Exp_{CCA2}(S, n, q, \mathcal{A})$ here:

1. The algorithm $Gen(1^n)$ is run and the key K is generated.
2. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is given the input 1^n and oracle access to $Enc_K()$ and $Dec_K()$.

3. The adversary outputs a pair of messages m_0 and m_1 of the same length.

4. A random bit $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$ is selected. The ciphertext $c \leftarrow Enc_K(m_b)$ is computed and given to $\mathcal{A}$.

5. The adversary continues to have oracle access to $Enc_K()$ and $Dec_K()$. However, the adversary is not allowed to query the decryption oracle with the ciphertext c. The adversary is limited to q total queries (including the queries issued before the challenge ciphertext is generated).

6. The adversary outputs a bit $\bar{b}$. The output of the experiment is 1 if $\bar{b} = b$ and 0 otherwise.

Inputs to $Enc_K()$ are of the form (P, M), and inputs to $Dec_K()$ are of the form (C, M) where M is a message number, and the adversary may not reuse M with the same key. If $Dec_K(C, M) = P$, for adversary query (C, M), then the adversary will not subsequently submit (P, M) to $Enc_K()$.

The encryption scheme S is defined to have CCA2 security for (ϵ, q) if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ limited to q queries, $Pr[Exp_{CCA2}(S, n, q, \mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq 1/2 + \epsilon$. We define $Adv^{CCA2}_{S,n,q}(\mathcal{A}) = [Pr[Exp_{CCA2}(S, n, q, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - 1/2$.

We also define the CCA2 MRAE security experiment which is identical to the experiment above except the adversary may reuse the message number M with the same key. However, no query can be submitted twice. In particular, m_0 and m_1 must be new queries. The encryption scheme S is defined to have CCA2 MRAE security for (ϵ, q) if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ limited to q queries, $Pr[Exp_{CCA2\_MRAE}(S, n, q, \mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq 1/2 + \epsilon$. We define $Adv^{CCA2\_MRAE}_{S,n,q}(\mathcal{A}) = [Pr[Exp_{CCA2\_MRAE}(S, n, q, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - 1/2$.

3.1.3 (Misuse Resistant) CPA Encryption

Given the CCA2 encryption experiment above, except we remove the decryption oracle from the experiment. We define the resulting experiment as the CPA encryption experiment, and if the adversary probability of success is bounded as above, we say that the encryption scheme is CPA secure for (ϵ, q). We have the analogous definitions for $Adv^{CPA}_{S,n,q}(\mathcal{A})$ and $Adv^{CPA\_MRAE}_{S,n,q}(\mathcal{A})$.

3.2 Proof of CCA2 Security

We prove security for the generalized scheme first (CCS):

$$\begin{aligned} X &= f_2(M, P_1) \oplus P_2 \\ X_2 &= f_2(X) \oplus P_1 \\ X_1 &= f_1(M, X_2) \oplus X \end{aligned}$$

where the ciphertext is X_1, X_2, together with M, a public message number and the f_i are pseudorandom functions. For maximum security, M is unique, with high probability, for each message encrypted under a given key K.

We will first prove CPA MRAE security for the stateless version of CCS. We will extend this proof for CMCC CCA2 security and CMCC CCA2 MRAE security.

Theorem 3.2.1 *The CCS encryption presented in the previous section is CPA MRAE secure for* (ϵ, q) *with*

$$\epsilon = q(q-1)/\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{k} Adv_{f_i}^{prf}(q)$$

given that the adversary is restricted to q *queries and given* $\alpha = 2^m$ *where* m *is the minimal bit size for the adversary queries.*

Proof: We will initially assume that f_1 and f_2 are random functions (in the idealized model). We will first obtain the probability bound for ensuring no collisions in the X values for the adversary queries. For $2 \leq i \leq q$, $(i-1)/\alpha$ is an upper bound on the probability that the X value for the ith ciphertext collides with the X value for one of the first $i-1$ ciphertexts. Thus

$$\left(1 - \frac{q-1}{\alpha}\right) \ldots \left(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\right) \approx e^{-q(q-1)/2\alpha}$$

is a lower bound on the probability of no collisions in the X values for the adversary queries. For sufficiently small values of $q(q-1)/2\alpha$, we can approximate the right hand side in the above inequality by $1 - (q(q-1)/2\alpha)$ and use $q(q-1)/2\alpha$ as the upper bound on the probability of collisions in the X values.

Since the X values are distinct, and f_2 is a random function, it follows that the $f_2(X)$ values are uniformly distributed and independent. Thus the X_2 values give no information about P_1. Since X_2 is uniform random, it follows that $f_1(M, X_2)$ is also uniform random and thus the X_1 values give no information about the X values, except if there is a collision between two query X_2 values. As discussed above for collisions between X values, we can use $q(q-1)/2\alpha$ as the upper bound on the probability of collisions in the X_2 values.

Thus the ciphertexts give no information about the X values.

We have

$$\begin{aligned}
Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ guesses } b] &= Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ guesses } b \bigwedge \text{collision}] + Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ guesses } b \bigwedge \text{no collision}] \\
&\leq Pr[\text{collision}] + Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ guesses } b \bigwedge \text{no collision}] \\
&\leq q(q-1)/\alpha + Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ guesses } b | \text{no collision}] \\
&= q(q-1)/\alpha + 1/2.
\end{aligned}$$

Now we prove the case where the f_i functions are pseudorandom functions (prfs). We construct an adversary D^g where g is either (h_1, h_2) or (h_1, f_2) and h_i, $1 \leq i \leq 2$ are random functions and f_2 is a prf. Then $Adv_{(h_1,h_2)}^{CPA\_MRAE} \leq q(q-1)/\alpha$. D^g will attack f_2 as a prf. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that attacks our encryption scheme. D^g runs $\mathcal{A}$. D uses g to answer $\mathcal{A}$'s encryption and decryption oracle queries. When $\mathcal{A}$ outputs bit b, D also outputs bit b.

$$\begin{aligned}
Adv_{f_2}^{prf}(q) \geq Adv_{f_2}^{prf}(D^g) &= |Pr[D^{(h_1,f_2)}() = 1] - Pr[D^{(h_1,h_2)}() = 1]| \\
&\geq Adv_{(h_1,f_2,n,q)}^{CPA_MRAE}(\mathcal{A}) - q(q-1)/\alpha.
\end{aligned}$$

Thus $Adv_{(h_1,f_2,n,q)}^{CPA\_MRAE}(\mathcal{A}) \leq Adv_{f_2}^{prf}(q) + q(q-1)/\alpha$ for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$. Now let $g = (h_1, f_2)$ or $g = (f_1, f_2)$ where f_1 and f_2 are prfs and h_1 is a random function. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
Adv_{f_1}^{prf}(q) \geq Adv_{f_1}^{prf}(D^g) &= |Pr[D^{(f_1,f_2)}() = 1] - Pr[D^{(h_1,f_2)}() = 1]| \\
&\geq Adv_{(f_1,f_2,n,q)}^{CPA_MRAE}(\mathcal{A}) - Adv_{f_2}^{prf}(q) - q(q-1)/\alpha.
\end{aligned}$$

for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$. Thus $Adv_{(f_1,f_2,n,q)}(\mathcal{A}) \leq q(q-1)/\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{2} Adv_{f_i}^{prf}$ for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$. ∎

CMCC is a general purpose authenticated encryption mode which is misuse resistant and optimized for energy constrained environments. As discussed above, we have a stateless version with public message numbers, and a stateful version with private message numbers. The stateless version has full misuse resistance against reuse of the message numbers, whereas the stateful version has resistance as well, but some private message numbers may result in decryption failures if too far outside the decrypt window.

For stateless version encryption, we initially utilize CBC mode and obtain the value X. Here we utilize $E_{\bar{K}}$ to create the CBC IV from the message number M. This prevents the adversary from being able manipulate M and P_1 in a way that allows collisions in X values to be created. Then we apply a MAC algorithm to X and use the result as the IV for a variant of counter mode encryption to encrypt P_1 and obtain X_2. Finally we create the other half of the ciphertext, X_1 using CBC mode applied to X_2 and exclusive-or with X.

For stateful encryption, the only difference is in how the message numbers are handled: the message number tag is $T = LSB_{IL}(E_{\bar{K}}(i))$ for message number i. This follows the description in Section 1.3.1.

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 describe the stateless version of CMCC, and Figure **??** gives the stateful version.

We now prove that CMCC is CCA2-secure.

Theorem 3.2.2 *The adversary is restricted to q queries; given $\alpha = 2^m$ where $MinLen$ is the minimal bit length of the adversary queries and $m = \lfloor MinLen/2 \rfloor$. B is the block length and μ is the total number of blocks in all the query plaintexts and ciphertexts. Stateless CMCC (where the authentication string Z can be any length including zero length) is CCA2 secure for (ϵ, q) with*

$$\epsilon = 2q/\alpha + q^2/2^{B+2} + 3\lceil |\textit{challenge ciphertext length}|/B \rceil \mu/2^B + \sum_{i=1}^{3} Adv_{f_i}^{prf}(q) + Adv_{E_{\bar{K}}}^{prf}(q)$$

Proof: We cannot, except for padding based collisions in $CBC(W, P_1)$ (based on encoding distinct P_1 values to identical encoded values), create two plaintexts that will yield identical X values. The reason is that M is fresh for the challenge ciphertext. The padding collision bound is $q^2/2^{B+2}$.

Given the challenge ciphertext, we have the $2q/\alpha$ bound for X collisions and P_1 collisions involving plaintext and ciphertext queries respectively. We also have the bound for collisions in the counter mode blocks and CBC blocks. Other than these events, X is fresh and $CBC(W, P_1)$ is also fresh so P_1 and P_2 aren't leaked to the adversary (W is fresh for all plaintext queries, and P_1 is fresh for all the ciphertext queries). ∎

Theorem 3.2.3 *Given the parameters defined in Theorem 3.2.2. CMCC stateful encryption scheme is CCA2 secure for (ϵ, q) with*

$$\epsilon = 2q/\alpha + q^2/2^{B+2} + 3\lceil |\textit{challenge ciphertext length}|/B \rceil \mu/2^B + \sum_{i=1}^{3} Adv_{f_i}^{prf}(q) + Adv_{E_{\bar{K}}}^{prf}(q)$$

given that the adversary is restricted to q queries and given $\alpha = 2^m$ where $MinLen$ is the minimal bit length of the adversary queries and $m = \lfloor MinLen/2 \rfloor$. Here we assume that the authentication string Z can be any length including zero length.

Proof: The adversary strategy is a subset of the possible strategies in the stateless case, so the theorem follows. ∎

3.3 CCA2 MRAE Security Proof

If the adversary can submit multiple ciphertext and plaintext queries with the same message number, it can cause collisions in X values and obtain additional advantage. Thus our proof of CCA MRAE security will depend on the authentication tag as defined in Figures 1.1, 1.2, and Figure **??** to defend against arbitrary ciphertext queries. We now state the CCA2 MRAE security theorem.

Theorem 3.3.1 *Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a bound on the maximum number of blocks in a query, μ is the total number of blocks in the adversary queries, and B is the cipher block length. CMCC encryption (stateless and stateful versions) is CCA2 MRAE secure for (ϵ, q) with*

$$\epsilon = q(q-1)/2\alpha + q/\alpha + q^2/2^{B+2} + \sum_{i=1}^{3} Adv^{prf}_{f_i}(q) + Adv^{prf}_{E_{\bar{K}}}(q) +$$
$$\lceil |challenge\ ciphertext|/B \rceil \mu/2^B + \max\{q\mathcal{M}^2/2^B, z/\alpha + \mathcal{M}(q-z)/2^B\} + 2^{-\tau}$$

given that the adversary is restricted to q queries, $\alpha = 2^m$ where $MinLen$ is the minimal bit length of the adversary queries and $m = \lfloor MinLen/2 \rfloor$, τ is the number of bits in the authentication tag, and $z \leq q$.[1]

Proof: The $2^{-\tau}$ term reflects the fact that we assume there are no valid decryption oracle queries. We also bound the probability of X_2 collisions between the challenge ciphertext and any of the queries. As above, the term $q^2/2^{B+2}$ is a bound on the probability of padding encoding distinct plaintexts into the same input string to block cipher encryption.

We have the following bounds on the probability of collisions in the counter variant and CBC modes. We first consider the counter-mode variant.

Suppose the challenge ciphertext has $|Y| \leq B$ (short length plaintext). Then queries with $|Y| \leq B$ can't match with the keystream block for the challenge ciphertext since the X values are distinct. (We already accounted for X collisions). The only exception is padding based colllisions and $\mu/2^{B+1}$ is a bound on those collisions. If $|Y| > B$, then $\lceil |challenge\ ciphertext|/B \rceil \mu/2^B$ bounds the probability of collision.

We now consider the CBC construction for X_1. To ensure security, we require that the input blocks for the challenge ciphertext be distinct from all of the input blocks for all of the queries (for the X_1 calculation.)

case i: $|X_2| < B$ for the challenge ciphertext $|X_2|$.
Then z queries with the same length X_2 values will result in a z/α probability of collision ($z \leq q$). The other queries will need to match on B bits and we have a $\mathcal{M}(q-z)/2^B$ bound on probability of collision. Thus the probability of collision is bounded by $z/\alpha + \mathcal{M}(q-z)/2^B$.

case ii: $|X_2| \geq B$ for the challenge ciphertext X_2 value.
Then we obtain a $\mathcal{M}^2 q/2^B$ bound if we want to bound any collisions between any 2 input blocks.

[1] Replace $2^{-\tau}$ with $x2^{-\tau}$ if up to $x-1$ invalid ciphertexts do not result in session termination.

Thus the total bound is the maximum of the two bounds for the CBC cases summed with the bound above. ∎

Remark: (i) We can replace the $2^{-\tau}$ term in the above theorem with $2^{-(\tau+\beta)}$ where β quantifies the number of higher level protocol check bits. (ii) We can eliminate the $2^{-\tau}$ term if $|P_2| \leq \tau$. (iii) We can replace the $2^{-\tau}$ term in the above theorem with $2^{-2\tau}$ if Z holds a MAC computed over the plaintext (e.g., using CMAC) instead of a zero bit string.

Chapter 4

Features

Security features are covered in Section 2. For completeness, we list the security features again:

1. The cipher is designed to provide the maximum possible robustness against message-number reuse, i.e., that the cipher maintains full integrity and confidentiality, except for leaking collisions of (plaintext,associated data,secret message number,public message number) via collisions of ciphertexts.

2. Ciphertext modification results in unpredictable changes to the plaintext; thus
   (a) modifications to a ciphertext will like cause a failure in higher level processing (resulting in session termination most likely)
   (b) data that is consumed immediately will be randomized and thus anomalous to the consuming agent, again causing alerts and/or session termination.

3. Stateful version: private message numbers will hide the number of messages previously sent.

4. Stateful version: replay protection can be enforced by the receiver.

We now discuss the main performance feature of CMCC.

4.1 Reduced Message Expansion

A key performance feature is the reduction in message expansion that CMCC offers. In energy constrained environments, the number of bytes that are sent and received are a major influence on energy consumption. Thus it is important to minimize the ciphertext expansion (including padding, authentication bits) as well as the message number sizes that are transmitted over the network in these environments.

From Section 1.2, the recommended parameters sets for CMCC have between 2 and 12 bytes of expansion. We note that the smaller number of bits for message numbers is complemented by the misuse resistance property in the sense that if a message number is reused, then the security impact is minimized.

CMCC compares favorably with existing ciphers for reducing energy consumption due to the reduced message expansion.

4.2 Precomputation of the Message Numbers/Encrypted Message Numbers and Reduced Number of Block Cipher Calls

Although not as computationally efficient as some one-pass algorithms such as OCB, CMCC does allow for some improved computational efficiencies compared with existing two-pass algorithms, especially for shorter plaintexts.

If precomputation can be leveraged, then the number of block cipher calls is reduced by one in the stateless case. Also, the stateful scheme leverages precomputation. Table 4.1 compares the number of block cipher calls for CMCC and CCM for various length plaintexts, assuming no precomputation.

4.3 Comparison with AES-GCM

Compared to GCM [McGrewViega], CMCC imposes less message expansion and is also misuse resistant. If GCM uses an 8 byte MAC with a 12 byte nonce, the total expansion is 20 bytes. CMCC with 4 bytes of authentication and a 4 byte PMN has 8 bytes of expansion in comparison. Although it is arguable whether these are equivalent security levels, CMCC does not require the same authentication overhead as GCM for some protocols since changes to a ciphertext creates a randomized plaintext. Since GCM uses counter mode, changes to a GCM ciphertext create a predictable plaintext.

CMCC can leverage associated data for overcoming message number repetitions. This factor combined with misuse resistance implies that there is more safety margin with a shorter message number. CMCC is targeted for lower bandwidth, energy constrained environments which also fits with using shorter message numbers.

GCM is well suited for high bandwidth networks where parallelism and leveraging precomputation are important. In this sense, GCM and CMCC can be viewed as tools for distinct application scenarios.

4.4 Comparison with AES-CCM

Compared with CCM [WhitHousFerg], CMCC is more computationally efficient for messages with 32 or fewer bytes (see Table 4.1), and is misuse resistant. In addition, CMCC has less message expansion. CMCC (RFC 3610) can use a nonce as small as 7 bytes; if we assume an 8 byte MAC, then the overhead is 15 bytes. CMCC with 4 bytes of authentication and a 4 byte PMN has 8 bytes of expansion.

Although it is arguable whether these are equivalent security levels, CMCC does not require the same authentication overhead as CCM for some protocols since changes to a ciphertext creates a randomized plaintext. Since CCM uses counter mode, changes to a CCM ciphertext create a predictable plaintext.

With precomputation, CCM is more computationally efficient for messages with more than 32 bytes whereas CMCC is more efficient for shorter ($\leq$ 32 byte) messages.

Message Length	*No. CCM block cipher calls*	*No. CMCC block cipher calls*
8 bytes	4	4
16 bytes	4	4
20 bytes	6	4
24 bytes	6	4
32 bytes	6	4
48 bytes	8	8
64 bytes	10	8
80 bytes	12	12
128 bytes	18	16

Table 4.1: Comparing Number of Block Cipher Calls for AES-CMCC and AES-CCM for Different Length Plaintexts

4.5 Comparison with AES-OCB

AES-OCB [KrovtzRogwy] is a highly computationally efficient one pass AE algorithm. Compared to OCB, CMCC provides misuse resistance and has less message expansion. CMCC is not as computationally efficient as OCB for longer messages.

4.6 Comparison with AES-SIV

SIV is a misuse resistant AE algorithm invented by Rogaway and Shrimpton [RogwyShrmptn]. SIV (as specified in RFC 5297) has a similar number of block cipher calls as CCM (see Table 4.1. Thus CMCC has fewer block cipher calls for some message lengths and this can be further reduced by one block cipher call if precomputation is available. SIV has the 16 byte IV overhead together with the nonce overhead. If similar size nonces are used, and CMCC uses 8 bytes of authentication, then CMCC has 8 bytes less message expansion. However, the probability of an authentication forgery would be lower with SIV, but for many protocols, 8 bytes of authentication is sufficient.

CMCC is also misuse resistant.

4.7 Comparison with PTE

PTE is another misuse resistant approach from [RogwyShrmptn]. It utilizes a TES (Tweakable Enciphering Scheme) [LskvRvstWgnr, HR03] combined with authentication consisting of padding with zero bytes. CMCC uses the same approach. However, the TES that [RogwyShrmptn] proposes does not accomodate plaintexts smaller than the block cipher length, unless padding is used. Thus CMCC has smaller expansion for smaller than blocklength messages.

4.8 Applications

CMCC is well suited for applications that have one or more of the following properties:

1. Protocols encapsulated with the ciphertext (higher layer protocols) have control fields that act as authentication bits given the randomizing that occurs if a ciphertext is modified.

2. A single randomized plaintext will either have minimal effect on the session (e.g., VoIP) or will result in the termination of the session due to failing a protocol check.

3. Due to limitations of the network environment, it is difficult for an adversary to generate a large number of queries.

These applications can obtain reasonable security with smaller additional authentication overhead and can also function with smaller message numbers. CMCC is well-suited for VoIP and wireless sensor networks.

4.9 Justification for Recommended Parameter Sets

4.9.1 Stateless: Authentication tag length 8 bytes, PMN length 4 bytes

The first recommended parameter set is the default recommendation. In particular, for environments where the set of applications that will be used is not fully understood, then this first parameter set should be used. It offers the most authentication security given the 8 bytes of authentication it provides. Thus it provides security for a wider set of applications. The protocols that are included in the ciphertext (higher layer protocols) will, in most cases, still provide additional authentication bits given the protocol specific checks that occur.

The 4 byte PMN size implies that the PMN will cycle after 2^{32} plaintexts which is a bound on the number of plaintexts encrypted under a single key unless distinct associated data is present for all messages in which case cycling on the PMN does not affect security.

This parameter set is suitable for plaintexts of all lengths.

4.9.2 Stateless: Authentication tag length 4 bytes, PMN length 4 bytes

The second recommended parameter set can be used for environments where less authentication security is needed and message compactness is a higher priority. For example, environments where an adversary can make a smaller number of queries for a single key (e.g., less network bandwidth), or where higher layer protocols provide sufficient additional authentication bits are appropriate.

The 4 byte PMN size implies that the PMN will cycle after 2^{32} plaintexts which is a bound on the number of plaintexts encrypted under a single key unless distinct associated data is present for all messages in which case cycling on the PMN does not affect security.

This parameter set is suitable for plaintexts of all lengths.

4.9.3 Stateless: Authentication tag length 4 bytes, PMN length 2 bytes

This parameter set can be used for environments where less authentication security is needed and message compactness is a higher priority. For example, environments where an adversary can make a smaller number of queries for a single key (e.g., less network bandwidth), or where higher layer protocols provide sufficient additional authentication bits are appropriate.

The 2 byte PMN size implies that the PMN will cycle after 2^{16} plaintexts which is a bound on the number of plaintexts encrypted under a single key unless distinct associated data is present for all messages in which case cycling on the PMN does not affect security.

This parameter set is suitable for plaintexts of all lengths.

4.9.4 Stateless: Authentication tag length 2 bytes, PMN length 4 bytes

Usage of this parameter set requires a precise understanding of the higher layer protocols. In this case, security depends to a greater degree on the authentication bits that are provided through the higher layer protocol checks that occur (since a modified ciphertext will randomize the plaintext bits), and the degree of impact that will result due to a successful forgery. Some higher level protocols may not provide enough authentication bits, or the impact of an authentication forgery may be too high, which would make this parameter set an inappropriate choice.

The 4 byte PMN size implies that the PMN will cycle after 2^{32} plaintexts which is a bound on the number of plaintexts encrypted under a single key unless distinct associated data is present for all messages in which case cycling on the PMN does not affect security.

This parameter set is suitable for plaintexts with lengths that are 4 bytes or longer.

4.9.5 Stateless: Authentication tag length 2 bytes, PMN length 2 bytes

Usage of this parameter set requires a precise understanding of the higher layer protocols. In this case, security depends to a greater degree on the authentication bits that are provided through the higher layer protocol checks that occur (since a modified ciphertext will randomize the plaintext bits), and the degree of impact that will result due to a successful forgery. Some higher level protocols may not provide enough authentication bits, or the impact of an authentication forgery may be too high, which would make this parameter set an inappropriate choice.

Reduced PMN size makes sense when either a reduced number of messages (up to 2^{16} for the 2 byte PMN) will be encrypted under a single key, or distinct associated data is present for all messages in which case cycling on the PMN does not affect security.

This parameter set is suitable for plaintexts with lengths that are 4 bytes or longer.

Chapter 5

Design Rationale

The main goals of this cipher are reduced message expansion and misuse resistance. Since CMCC is CCA-secure even when zero bytes of authentication are used, we can reduce the size of the authentication overhead. We have also utilized two mechanisms (stateless and stateful schemes respectively) to reduce the size of the message number information that is sent over the network.

CMCC requires additional block cipher operations vs. a one-pass algorithm such as OCB. So our design requires additional computational overhead in order to obtain the property where modified ciphertexts lead to randomized plaintexts.

The designer/designers have not hidden any weaknesses in this cipher. The security proof for CMCC rules out any weaknesses outside AES.

Chapter 6

Intellectual Property

There are no known patents, patent applications, planned patent applications, or other intellectual property constraints relevant to the use of this cipher. If any of this information changes, the submitter/submitters will promptly (and within at most one month) announce these changes on the crypto-competitions mailing list.

Chapter 7

Consent

The submitter/submitters hereby consent to all decisions of the CAESAR selection committee regarding the selection or non-selection of this submission as a second-round candidate, a third-round candidate, a finalist, a member of the final portfolio, or any other designation provided by the committee. The submitter/submitters understand that the committee will not comment on the algorithms, except that for each selected algorithm the committee will simply cite the previously published analyses that led to the selection of the algorithm. The submitter/submitters understand that the selection of some algorithms is not a negative comment regarding other algorithms, and that an excellent algorithm might fail to be selected simply because not enough analysis was available at the time of the committee decision. The submitter/submitters acknowledge that the committee decisions reflect the collective expert judgments of the committee members and are not subject to appeal. The submitter/submitters understand that if they disagree with published analyses then they are expected to promptly and publicly respond to those analyses, not to wait for subsequent committee decisions. The submitter/submitters understand that this statement is required as a condition of consideration of this submission by the CAESAR selection committee.

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