HS1-SIV uses a new PRF called HS1 to provide authenticated encryption via Rogaway and Shrimpton’s SIV mode [5]. HS1 (mnemonic for “Hash-Stream 1”) is designed for high software speed on systems with good 32-bit processing, including Intel SSE, ARM Neon, and 32-bit architectures without SIMD support. HS1 uses a universal hash function to consume arbitrary strings and a stream cipher to produce its output.

This document defines HS1 and how to use it in an SIV construction. HS1 takes an arbitrary input string and IV and produces a pseudorandom string of any desired length. Each different (input, IV) pair supplied to HS1 yields an independent pseudorandom stream with high probability. SIV, as defined in [5], uses a block-cipher-based PRF to create a synthetic IV (an SIV) from given associated data and plaintext. The SIV is then used to encrypt the plaintext using a block-cipher-based encryption scheme. HS1-SIV instead uses HS1 to instantiate SIV mode. Ignoring many details for the moment, if $A$ is the associated data, $M$ is the plaintext, and $N$ is HS1’s IV, then the SIV is defined as the first 16 bytes of HS1($A || M, N$) and ciphertext $C$ is defined as all but the first 16 bytes of HS1(SIV, $N$) xor’ed with $M$. The SIV and ciphertext are bundled together to create the final ciphertext. If ($A, M, N$) is repeated, then an observer knows this fact because the scheme is deterministic and teh SIV will be identical, but no security degradation otherwise occurs. Supplying $N$ as a nonce thus improves security by masking repeated encryptions.

HS1 does its work by pairing an almost-universal hash function with a stream cipher. When given an (input, IV) pair, HS1 uses the hash function to hash the input, it then xor’s this hash result with the stream cipher’s key and uses the HS1 IV as the stream cipher’s IV. The stream cipher produces as many bytes as desired. As long as a (hash result, IV) pair is never repeated, and the stream cipher is secure against related-key attacks, the stream cipher will produce independent pseudorandom output streams. We introduce a new hash HS1-Hash which we use for the almost-universal phase of HS1, and Bernstein’s Chacha is used as the stream cipher [1].

1 Specification

The figures in this document fully specify HS1-SIV with the exception of the Chacha stream cipher. We use the Chacha version specified in ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF protocols [3], and attach it to make this document self-contained. The interface defined in that document has Chacha take four inputs: A 32-byte key, an initial counter value, a 12-byte IV, and a plaintext. The ciphertext produced is the same length as the plaintext and is pseudorandom. This document adopts that interface. Chacha[$r$]($K, c, N, X$) indicates the $r$-round Chacha encryption of $X$ using key $K$, initial counter value $c$, and IV $N$. When we simply want an $n$-byte pseudorandom string, we let $X$ be $n$ zero bytes.

1 Department of Computer Science, California State University, Sacramento CA 95819. This work supported by the generous support of NSF grants CNS-1314592 and CNS-0904380.
1.1 Parameters

There are four parameters used throughout this specification, \( b, t, r, \ell \). Parameter \( b \) specifies the number of bytes used in part of the hashing algorithm (larger \( b \) tends to produce higher throughput on longer messages). Parameter \( t \) selects the collision level of the hashing algorithm (higher \( t \) produces higher security and lower throughput). Parameter \( r \) specifies the number of internal rounds used by the stream cipher (higher \( r \) produces higher security and lower throughput). Parameter \( \ell \) specifies the byte-length of synthetic IV used (higher \( \ell \) improves security and increases ciphertext lengths by \( \ell \) bytes). The following table names parameter sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>( b )</th>
<th>( t )</th>
<th>( r )</th>
<th>( \ell )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hs1-siv-lo</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hs1-siv</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hs1-siv-hi</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2 Notation

The algorithms in this document manipulate integers, vectors of integers, and strings of bytes. Vector and string indices begin with zero. If \( \text{v} \) is a vector, then \( \text{v}[a] \) is its \( a \)-th element and \( \text{v}[a,n] \) is the \( n \)-element subvector beginning at index \( a \): \( \langle \text{v}[a], \text{v}[a+1], \ldots, \text{v}[a+n-1] \rangle \). Similarly, if \( S \) is a string, then \( S[a,n] \) is the \( n \)-byte substring of \( S \) beginning at index \( a \). The number of elements in \( \text{v} \) and \( S \) is indicated \( |\text{v}| \) and \( |S| \). Concatenation is accomplished using “\( || \)” (eg, \( (1,2,3)||4,5) = (1,2,3,4,5) \) and \( 0xf0||0xa8 = 0xf0a8 \). The bitwise exclusive-or of same-length strings \( A \) and \( B \) is \( A \oplus B \). A string of \( k \) zero-bytes is represented \( 0^k \). \( \text{pad}(n,S) = S||0^k \) where \( k \) is the smallest non-negative integer making the length of \( S||0^k \) a non-negative multiple of \( n \) bytes. \( \text{toStr}(n,x) \) is the \( n \)-byte unsigned little-endian binary representation of integer \( x \) (eg, \( \text{toStr}(2,3) = 0x0300 \)). \( \text{tolnts}(n,S) \) is the vector of integers obtained by breaking \( S \) into \( n \)-byte chunks and little-endian interpreting each chunk as an unsigned integer (eg, \( \text{tolnts}(2,0x05000600) = (5,6) \)).
Inputs:
\( k \), a vector \((K_S, k_N, k_P, k_A)\), where
- \( K_S \) is a string of 32 bytes,
- \( k_N \) is a vector of \( b/4 + 4(t - 1) \) integers from \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^{32}} \),
- \( k_P \) is a vector of \( t \) integers from \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^{50}} \), and
- \( k_A \) is a vector of \( 3t \) integers from \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^{64}} \)

\( M \), a string of any length
\( N \), a 12-byte string
\( y \), an integer in \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^{38}} \)

Output:
\( Y \), a string of \( y \) bytes

Algorithm:
1. \( A_i = \text{HS1-Hash}[b, t](k_N[4i, b/4], k_P[i], k_A[3i, 3], M) \) for each \( 0 \leq i < t \)
2. \( Y = \text{Chacha}[r](\text{pad}(32, A_0 || A_1 || \ldots || A_{t-1}) \oplus K_S), 0, N, 0^y) \)

Figure 2: HS1 PRF. Hash \( M \) a total of \( t \) times with different keys and combine the result with the stream cipher’s key.

vectors of integers \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \), \( \text{Prod}(v_1, v_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (v_1[i] \times v_2[i]) \) where \( n = \min(|v_1|, |v_2|) \).

## 2 Security Goals

HS1-SIV provides confidentiality of plaintexts and integrity of ciphertexts, associated data and public message numbers. No private message numbers are employed by HS1-SIV. If we say an adversary can win an attack against HS1-SIV by (i) guessing the key in use or (ii) causing two different encryptions to use the same synthetic IV, then the following table summarizes an adversary’s probability of success over \( n \) encryptions, each of no more than \( 2^{32} \) bytes, or \( n \) key guesses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Key Search</th>
<th>SIV Collision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hs1-siv-lo</td>
<td>( n/2^{256} )</td>
<td>( n^2/2^{56} + n^2/2^{104} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hs1-siv</td>
<td>( n/2^{256} )</td>
<td>( n^2/2^{112} + n^2/2^{128} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hs1-siv-hi</td>
<td>( n/2^{256} )</td>
<td>( n^2/2^{168} + n^2/2^{256} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SIV is designed to provide the maximum possible robustness against nonce reuse. HS1-SIV maintains full integrity and confidentiality, except for leaking collisions of (plaintext, associated data, public message number) via collisions of ciphertexts. If two different (plaintext, associated data, public message number) triples produce the same SIV, then forgeries become possible.

## 3 Security Analysis

HS1 is a composition of HS1-Hash, an almost-universal hash function, with Chacha, a stream cipher. HS1-Hash is itself a composition of two hashes. Similar to techniques used in VMAC [4],
any selected 48-byte inputs to the cores, and in Salsa and Chacha the cores are used simply in an inner-product hash is used to reduce the input by a fixed ratio to an intermediate string which is then hashed to a fixed size by a polynomial evaluation. It uses well-known and well-studied techniques. The inner-product hashes inputs of length $bm$ bytes to ones of length $8m$ bytes with a collision probability of no more than $2^{-28}$. The resulting $8m$-byte string is hashed using a standard polynomial hash modulo the prime $2^{61} - 1$. Because the polynomial’s key is chosen over a restricted set (for performance reasons), the final collision probability is no more than $m2^{-60} + 2^{-28}$. To reduce the chance of collision, this hashing procedure is repeated $t$ times, with different keys, for an ultimate collision probability of no more than $(m2^{-60} + 2^{-28})^t$.

We conjecture Chacha is secure against related-key attacks: an adversary with reasonably limited resources would have difficulty distinguishing between $f(X, N) = \text{Chacha}(X \oplus K, 0, N, 0^\ell)$ and a randomly chosen function with the same signature $\{0,1\}^{256} \times \{0,1\}^{96} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$ when $K$ is a high-entropy 256-bit string unknown to the adversary and $\ell$ is any positive number. This conjecture is supported by numerous statements by Bernstein and the way Chacha and Salsa “cores” are deployed in Chacha, Salsa and Rumba. Bernstein’s statements have been directed toward Salsa, Chacha’s predecessor, but Chacha is simply Salsa with a couple of small improvements, and it is widely believed that Chacha inherits all of Salsa’s positive security features. Bernstein’s statements and uses are consistent with the belief that the Salsa and Chacha cores are simply pseudorandom functions mapping 48-byte inputs to 64-byte outputs. If this is true, then the conjecture that Chacha is secure against related-key attacks is immediate. In Salsa20 security Bernstein writes: “The reader might guess that Salsa is highly resistant to related-key attacks.” In Response to “On the Salsa core function” Bernstein claims that the core is designed “to eliminate all visible structure”. In the Rumba compression function, adversaries are allowed to provide any selected 48-byte inputs to the cores, and in Salsa and Chacha the cores are used simply in counter mode to produce their pseudorandom streams.
HS1-Subkeygen $[b, t, r, \ell](K)$

Inputs:
- $K$, a non-empty string of up to 32 bytes

Output:
- $(K_S, k_N, k_P, k_A)$, where
  - $K_S$ is a 32-byte string,
  - $k_N$ is a vector of $b/4 + 4(t - 1)$ integers from $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{32}}$,
  - $k_P$ is a vector of $t$ integers from $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{60}}$, and
  - $k_A$ is a vector of $3t$ integers from $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{64}}$

Algorithm:
1. $\text{ChachaLen} = 32$
2. $\text{NHLen} = b + 16(t - 1)$
3. $\text{PolyLen} = 8t$
4. $\text{ASULen} = 24t$
5. $y = \text{ChachaLen} + \text{NHLen} + \text{PolyLen} + \text{ASULen}$
6. $K' = (K||K||K||\ldots)[0,32]$
7. $N = \text{toStr}(12,b2^{48} + t2^{40} + r2^{32} + \ell2^{16} + |K|)$
8. $T = \text{Chacha}[r](K', 0, N, 0^y)$
9. $K_S = T[0, \text{ChachaLen}]$
10. $k_N = \text{toInts}(4, T[\text{ChachaLen}, \text{NHLen}])$
11. $k_P = \text{map}(\text{mod} \ 2^{60}, \text{toInts}(8, T[\text{ChachaLen} + \text{NHLen}, \text{PolyLen}]))$
12. $k_A = \text{toInts}(8, T[\text{ChachaLen} + \text{NHLen} + \text{PolyLen}, \text{ASULen}])$

Figure 4: HS1-Subkeygen takes any length key and uses Chacha to produce all internal keys needed by HS1.

HS1 is essentially defined $\text{HS1}(K, h, X, N, \ell) = \text{Chacha}(h(X) \oplus K, 0, N, 0^\ell)$ where $K$ is a high-entropy key and $h$ is from HS1-Hash. As long as $(h(X) \oplus K, N)$ values are distinct, Chacha will always produce independent pseudorandom streams. HS1 is designed to make it unlikely that $(h(X) \oplus K, N)$ pairs ever repeat. A user supplied nonce is used for $N$ with each message, and even if this facility is misused by giving the same nonce repeatedly, $h(X)$ will be distinct with high probability over a sequence of distinct $X$ values.

4 Features

HS1-SIV is designed to have the following features.

Competitive speed on multiple architectures. HS1-SIV is designed to exploit 32-bit multiplication and SIMD processing, which are well-supported on almost all current CPUs. This ensures a consistent performance profile over a wide range of processors, including modern embedded ones.

Provable security. HS1-Hash and SIV are based on well-known and proven constructions [4, 5]. The only security assumption needed is that the Chacha stream cipher is a good pseudorandom generator and secure against related-key attacks.

Nonce misuse resistant. No harm is done when a nonce is reused, except that it is revealed whether corresponding (associated data, plaintext) pairs have been repeated. If (associated
HS1-SIV-Decrypt\([b, t, r, \ell](K, (T, C), A, N)\)

**Inputs:**
- \(K\), a non-empty string of up to 32 bytes
- \((T, C)\), an \(\ell\)-byte string and a string shorter than \(2^{64}\) bytes, respectively
- \(A\), a string shorter than \(2^{64}\) bytes
- \(N\), a 12-byte string

**Output:**
- \(M\), a \(|C|\)-byte string, or AuthenticationError

**Algorithm:**
1. \(k = \text{HS1-subkeygen}[b, t, r, \ell](K)\)
2. \(M' = \text{pad}(16, A) || \text{pad}(16, M) || \text{toStr}(8, |A|) || \text{toStr}(8, |M|)\)
3. \(T' = \text{HS1}[b, t, r](K, M', N, \ell)\)
4. **if** \((T = T')\) **then** return \(M\)
5. **else** return AuthenticationError

Figure 5: Decryption. The \(\ell\)-byte string \(T\) serves as authenticator for \(A\) and \(M\), and serves as IV for the decryption of \(C\). Algorithm parameters \(b, t, r, \ell\) effect security and performance.

Data, plaintext) pairs are known to never repeat, no nonce need be used at all.

**Scalable.** Different security levels are available for different tasks, with varying throughput.

**General-purpose PRF.** The general nature of HS1 makes it useful for a variety of tasks, such as entropy harvesting, random generation, and other IV-based encryption and authentication schemes. A single software library could provide multiple services under a single key by simply partitioning the nonce space and providing access to HS1.

With the exception of provable security, all of the above features are improvements over GCM.

## 5 Design Rationale

HS1-SIV is designed to exploit a variable-input-length/variable-output-length PRF. This abstraction allows the PRF and its application to be designed separately. Although the PRF could be used in several different ways to realize authenticated encryption, SIV is a natural fit because its definition requires variable input-lengths to be consumed, variable output lengths to be produced, and the intermediate value—the synthetic IV—to be exposed. Furthermore, SIV enjoys provable security, allowing the security focus of HS1-SIV to be entirely on HS1.

HS1 is conceived as a fast almost-universal hash function composed with a fast stream cipher, with little integration overhead. HS1-Hash is heavily influence by VMAC \([4]\), which targets beefy CPUs, but with the assumption that 32-bit multiplication—with or without SIMD acceleration—will be the maximum-size available efficient multiplication. This allows good performance on a wide range of CPU’s; from modern embedded CPU’s (the 43 thousand gate ARM Cortex-M3 has 32-bit multiplication with a 64-bit result) to modern Intel processors (Intel’s current AVX instruction set can process four 32-bit multiplies in a single instruction). The result is a hash that performs nearly as well on 32-bit CPUs as 64-bit ones. Bernstein’s Chacha is chosen as the stream cipher for three reasons: it is one of the fastest stream ciphers in software on our target systems, its key
setup is simple and fast, and it is secure against related-key attacks.

The designer has not hidden any weaknesses in this cipher.

6 Intellectual Property

The submitter knows of no known patents, patent applications, planned patent applications, or other intellectual-property constraints relevant to use of HS1-SIV. If any of this information changes, the submitter/submitters will promptly (and within at most one month) announce these changes on the crypto-competitions mailing list.

7 Consent

The submitter/submitters hereby consent to all decisions of the CAESAR selection committee regarding the selection or non-selection of this submission as a second-round candidate, a third-round candidate, a finalist, a member of the final portfolio, or any other designation provided by the committee. The submitter/submitters understand that the committee will not comment on the algorithms, except that for each selected algorithm the committee will simply cite the previously published analyses that led to the selection of the algorithm. The submitter/submitters understand that the selection of some algorithms is not a negative comment regarding other algorithms, and that an excellent algorithm might fail to be selected simply because not enough analysis was available at the time of the committee decision. The submitter/submitters acknowledge that the committee decisions reflect the collective expert judgments of the committee members and are not subject to appeal. The submitter/submitters understand that if they disagree with published analyses then they are expected to promptly and publicly respond to those analyses, not to wait for subsequent committee decisions. The submitter/submitters understand that this statement is required as a condition of consideration of this submission by the CAESAR selection committee.

References


Abstract

This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher, as well as the use of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms, and as a "combined mode", or Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithm.

This document does not introduce any new crypto, but is meant to serve as a stable reference and an implementation guide.

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1. Introduction

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - [FIPS-197]) has become the gold standard in encryption. Its efficient design, wide implementation, and hardware support allow for high performance in many areas. On most modern platforms, AES is anywhere from 4x to 10x as fast as the previous most-used cipher, 3-key Data Encryption Standard (3DES - [FIPS-46]), which makes it not only the best choice, but the only choice.

The problem is that if future advances in cryptanalysis reveal a weakness in AES, users will be in an unenviable position. With the only other widely supported cipher being the much slower 3DES, it is not feasible to re-configure implementations to use 3DES. [standby-cipher] describes this issue and the need for a standby cipher in greater detail.

This document defines such a standby cipher. We use ChaCha20 ([chacha]) with or without the Poly1305 ([poly1305]) authenticator. These algorithms are not just fast and secure. They are fast even if software-only C-language implementations, allowing for much quicker deployment when compared with algorithms such as AES that are significantly accelerated by hardware implementations.

These document does not introduce these new algorithms. They have been defined in scientific papers by D. J. Bernstein, which are referenced by this document. The purpose of this document is to serve as a stable reference for IETF documents making use of these algorithms.

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The description of the ChaCha algorithm will at various time refer to the ChaCha state as a "vector" or as a "matrix". This follows the use of these terms in DJB’s paper. The matrix notation is more visually convenient, and gives a better notion as to why some rounds are called "column rounds" while others are called "diagonal rounds". Here’s a diagram of how to matrixes relate to vectors (using the C language convention of zero being the index origin).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The elements in this vector or matrix are 32-bit unsigned integers.

The algorithm name is "ChaCha". "ChaCha20" is a specific instance
where 20 "rounds" (or 80 quarter rounds - see Section 2.1) are used. Other variations are defined, with 8 or 12 rounds, but in this document we only describe the 20-round ChaCha, so the names "ChaCha" and "ChaCha20" will be used interchangeably.

2. The Algorithms

The subsections below describe the algorithms used and the AEAD construction.

2.1. The ChaCha Quarter Round

The basic operation of the ChaCha algorithm is the quarter round. It operates on four 32-bit unsigned integers, denoted a, b, c, and d. The operation is as follows (in C-like notation):

- \( a += b; d ^= a; d <<< 16; \)
- \( c += d; b ^= c; b <<< 12; \)
- \( a += b; d ^= a; d <<< 8; \)
- \( c += d; b ^= c; b <<< 7; \)

Where "+" denotes integer addition without carry, "^" denotes a bitwise XOR, and "<<< n" denotes an n-bit left rotation (towards the high bits).

For example, let’s see the add, XOR and roll operations from the first line with sample numbers:

- \( b = 0x01020304 \)
- \( a = 0x11111111 \)
- \( d = 0x01234567 \)
- \( a = a + b = 0x11111111 + 0x01020304 = 0x12131415 \)
- \( d = d ^ a = 0x01234567 ^ 0x12131415 = 0x13305172 \)
- \( d = d <<< 16 = 0x51721330 \)

2.1.1. Test Vector for the ChaCha Quarter Round

For a test vector, we will use the same numbers as in the example, adding something random for c.

- \( a = 0x11111111 \)
- \( b = 0x01020304 \)
- \( c = 0x9b8d6f43 \)
- \( d = 0x01234567 \)

After running a Quarter Round on these 4 numbers, we get these:
2.2. A Quarter Round on the ChaCha State

The ChaCha state does not have 4 integer numbers, but 16. So the quarter round operation works on only 4 of them – hence the name. Each quarter round operation operates on 4 pre-determined numbers in the ChaCha state. We will denote by QUATERROUND(x,y,z,w) a quarter-round operation on the numbers at indexes x, y, z, and w of the ChaCha state when viewed as a vector. For example, if we apply QUARTERROUND(1,5,9,13) to a state, this means running the quarter round operation on the elements marked with an asterisk, while leaving the others alone:

```
0  *a   2   3
4  *b   6   7
8  *c  10  11
12  *d  14  15
```

Note that this run of quarter round is part of what is called a "column round".

2.2.1. Test Vector for the Quarter Round on the ChaCha state

For a test vector, we will use a ChaCha state that was generated randomly:

Sample ChaCha State

```
879531e0  c5ecf37d  516461b1  c9a62f8a
44c20ef3  3390af7f  d9fc690b  2a5f714c
53372767  b00a5631  974c541a  359e9963
5c971061  3d631689  2098d9d6  91dbd320
```

We will apply the QUARTERROUND(2,7,8,13) operation to this state. For obvious reasons, this one is part of what is called a "diagonal round":

```
After applying \texttt{QUARTERROUND(2,7,8,13)}

\begin{verbatim}
879531e0  c5ecf37d  bdb886dc  c9a62f8a
44c20ef3  3390af7f  d9fc690b  cfacafd2
e46bea80  b00a5631  974c541a  359e9963
5c971061  ccc07c79  2098d9d6  91dbd320
\end{verbatim}

Note that only the numbers in positions 2, 7, 8, and 13 changed.

2.3. The ChaCha20 block Function

The ChaCha block function transforms a ChaCha state by running multiple quarter rounds.

The inputs to ChaCha20 are:
\begin{itemize}
\item A 256-bit key, treated as a concatenation of 8 32-bit little-endian integers.
\item A 96-bit nonce, treated as a concatenation of 3 32-bit little-endian integers.
\item A 32-bit block count parameter, treated as a 32-bit little-endian integer.
\end{itemize}

The output is 64 random-looking bytes.

The ChaCha algorithm described here uses a 256-bit key. The original algorithm also specified 128-bit keys and 8- and 12-round variants, but these are out of scope for this document. In this section we describe the ChaCha block function.

Note also that the original ChaCha had a 64-bit nonce and 64-bit block count. We have modified this here to be more consistent with recommendations in section 3.2 of [RFC5116]. This limits the use of a single (key,nonce) combination to 2\(^32\) blocks, or 256 GB, but that is enough for most uses. In cases where a single key is used by multiple senders, it is important to make sure that they don't use the same nonces. This can be assured by partitioning the nonce space so that the first 32 bits are unique per sender, while the other 64 bits come from a counter.

The ChaCha20 algorithm follows:
\begin{itemize}
\item The first 4 words (0-3) are constants: 0x61707865, 0x3320646e, 0x79622d32, 0x6b206574.
\item The next 8 words (4-11) are taken from the 256-bit key by reading the bytes in little-endian order, in 4-byte chunks.
\item Word 12 is a block counter. Since each block is 64-byte, a 32-bit word is enough for 256 Gigabytes of data.
\end{itemize}
o Words 13-15 are a nonce, which should not be repeated for the same key. The 13th word is the first 32 bits of the input nonce taken as a little-endian integer, while the 15th word is the last 32 bits.

```
cccccccc  cccccccc  cccccccc  cccccccc
kkkkkkkk  kkkkkkkk  kkkkkkk  kkkkkkk  kkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkk  kkkkkkkk  kkkkkkkk  kkkkkkk  kkkkkkkk
bbbbbbbb  nnnnnnnn  nnnnnnn nnnnnnnn
```
c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce

ChaCha20 runs 20 rounds, alternating between "column" and "diagonal" rounds. Each round is 4 quarter-rounds, and they are run as follows. Rounds 1-4 are part of the "column" round, while 5-8 are part of the "diagonal" round:
1. QUARTERROUND ( 0, 4, 8,12)
2. QUARTERROUND ( 1, 5, 9,13)
3. QUARTERROUND ( 2, 6,10,14)
4. QUARTERROUND ( 3, 7,11,15)
5. QUARTERROUND ( 0, 5,10,15)
6. QUARTERROUND ( 1, 6,11,12)
7. QUARTERROUND ( 2, 7, 8,13)
8. QUARTERROUND ( 3, 4, 9,14)

At the end of 20 rounds, the original input words are added to the output words, and the result is serialized by sequencing the words one-by-one in little-endian order.

2.3.1. Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Block Function

For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20 block function:
o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13:14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f. The key is a sequence of octets with no particular structure before we copy it into the ChaCha state.
o Nonce = (00:00:00:09:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00)
o Block Count = 1.

After setting up the ChaCha state, it looks like this:

ChaCha State with the key set up.

```
61707865 3320646e 79622ad32 6b206574
03020100 07060504 0b0a9090 0f0e0d0c
13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1ed1c
00000001 09000000 4a000000 00000000
```
After running 20 rounds (10 column rounds interleaved with 10
diagonal rounds), the ChaCha state looks like this:

ChaCha State after 20 rounds

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
837778ab & e238d763 & a67ae21e & 5950bb2f \\
c4f2d0c7 & fc62bb2f & 8fa018fc & 3f5ec7b7 \\
335271c2 & f29489f3 & eabda8fc & 82e46ebd \\
d19c12b4 & b04e16de & 9e83d0cb & 4e3c50a2
\end{array}
\]

Finally we add the original state to the result (simple vector or
matrix addition), giving this:

ChaCha State at the end of the ChaCha20 operation

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
e4e7f110 & 15593bd1 & 1fdd0f50 & c47120a3 \\
c7f4d1c7 & 0368c033 & 9aaa2204 & 4e6cd4c3 \\
466482d2 & 09aa9f07 & 05d7c214 & a2028bd9 \\
d19c12b5 & b94e16de & e883d0cb & 4e3c50a2
\end{array}
\]

2.4. The ChaCha20 encryption algorithm

ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by D. J. Bernstein. It is a
refinement of the Salsa20 algorithm, and uses a 256-bit key.

ChaCha20 successively calls the ChaCha20 block function, with the
same key and nonce, and with successively increasing block counter
parameters. The resulting state is then serialized by writing the
numbers in little-endian order. Concatenating the results from the
successive blocks forms a key stream, which is then XOR-ed with the
plaintext. There is no requirement for the plaintext to be an
integral multiple of 512-bits. If there is extra keystream from the
last block, it is discarded. Specific protocols MAY require that the
plaintext and ciphertext have certain length. Such protocols need to
specify how the plaintext is padded, and how much padding it
receives.

The inputs to ChaCha20 are:

- A 256-bit key
- A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will
  usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use 1 if we use the
  zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time
  authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm.
- A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the
  Initialization Vector.
- An arbitrary-length plaintext

The output is an encrypted message of the same length.
2.4.1. Example and Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Cipher

For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20 block function:
  o Nonce = (00:00:00:00:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00).
  o Initial Counter = 1.

We use the following for the plaintext. It was chosen to be long enough to require more than one block, but not so long that it would make this example cumbersome (so, less than 3 blocks):

Plaintext Sunscreen:
000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6l
016 65 6d 65 6e 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73
032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20
048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20
064 6f 75 6c 64 20 62 65 20 69 74 2e
112 74 2e

The following figure shows 4 ChaCha state matrices:
1. First block as it is set up.
2. Second block as it is set up. Note that these blocks are only two bits apart - only the counter in position 12 is different.
3. Third block is the first block after the ChaCha20 block operation.
4. Final block is the second block after the ChaCha20 block operation was applied.
After that, we show the keystream.

First block setup:
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c
13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c
00000001 00000000 4a000000 00000000

Second block setup:
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c
13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c
00000002 00000000 4a000000 00000000
First block after block operation:

```
f3514f22  e1d91b40  6f27de2f  ed1d63b8
821f138c  e2062c3d  ecca4f7e  78cff39e
a30a3b8a  920a6072  cd7479b5  34932bed
40ba4c79  cd343ec6  4c2c21ea  b7417df0
```

Second block after block operation:

```
9f74a669  410f633f  28feca22  7ec44dec
6d34d426  738cb970  3ac5e9f3  45590cc4
da6e8b39  892c831a  cdea67c1  2b7e1d90
037463f3  a11a2073  e8bcfb88  edc49139
```

Keystream:
```
```

Finally, we XOR the Keystream with the plaintext, yielding the Ciphertext:

```
Ciphertext Sunscreen:
000  6e 2e 35 9a 25 68 f9 80 41 ba 07 28 dd 0d 69 81|n.5.%h..A...(i.
016  e9 7e 7a ec 61 d3 60 c2 0a 27 af cc fd 9f ae 0b|.-z..C'...'......
032  f9 1b 65 c5 52 47 33 ab 8f 59 3d ab cd 62 b3 57|..e.RG3..Y=..b.W
048  16 39 d6 24 e6 51 52 ab 8f 53 dc 35 9f 08 61 d8|.9.SQR..S5..a.
064  07 ca 0d bf 50 0d 6a 61 56 a3 8e 08 8a 22 b6 5e|....P.jaV.....".^
080  52 bc 51 4d 16 cc f8 06 81 8c e9 1a b7 79 37 36|R.QM..........y76
096  5a f9 0b bf 74 a3 5b e6 b4 0b 8e ed f2 78 5e 42|Z...t.[....X^B
112  87 4d |.M
```

2.5. The Poly1305 algorithm

Poly1305 is a one-time authenticator designed by D. J. Bernstein. Poly1305 takes a 32-byte one-time key and a message and produces a 16-byte tag.

The original article ([poly1305]) is entitled "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", and the MAC function there requires a 128-bit AES key, a 128-bit "additional key", and a 128-bit (non-secret) nonce. AES is used there for encrypting the nonce, so as to get a unique (and secret) 128-bit string, but as the paper states, "There is nothing special about AES here. One can replace AES with an arbitrary keyed function from an arbitrary set of nonces to 16-byte strings."
Regardless of how the key is generated, the key is partitioned into two parts, called "r" and "s". The pair (r,s) should be unique, and MUST be unpredictable for each invocation (that is why it was originally obtained by encrypting a nonce), while "r" MAY be constant, but needs to be modified as follows before being used: ("r" is treated as a 16-octet little-endian number):

- r[3], r[7], r[11], and r[15] are required to have their top four bits clear (be smaller than 16)
- r[4], r[8], and r[12] are required to have their bottom two bits clear (be divisible by 4)

The following sample code clamps "r" to be appropriate:

```c
#include "poly1305aes_test.h"

void poly1305aes_test_clamp(unsigned char r[16])
{
    r[3] &= 15;
    r[7] &= 15;
    r[15] &= 15;
    r[4] &= 252;
    r[8] &= 252;
    r[12] &= 252;
}
```

The "s" should be unpredictable, but it is perfectly acceptable to generate both "r" and "s" uniquely each time. Because each of them is 128-bit, pseudo-randomly generating them (see Section 2.6) is also acceptable.

The inputs to Poly1305 are:
- A 256-bit one-time key
- An arbitrary length message

The output is a 128-bit tag.

First, the "r" value should be clamped.

Next, set the constant prime "P" be 2^130-5: 3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffb. Also set a variable "accumulator" to zero.
Next, divide the message into 16-byte blocks. The last one might be shorter:
- Read the block as a little-endian number.
- Add one bit beyond the number of octets. For a 16-byte block this is equivalent to adding $2^{128}$ to the number. For the shorter block it can be $2^{120}$, $2^{112}$, or any power of two that is evenly divisible by 8, all the way down to $2^8$.
- If the block is not 17 bytes long (the last block), pad it with zeros. This is meaningless if you’re treating it them as numbers.
- Add this number to the accumulator.
- Multiply by "r"
- Set the accumulator to the result modulo $p$. To summarize: $\text{Acc} = ((\text{Acc}+\text{block}) \times \text{r}) \mod p$.

Finally, the value of the secret key "s" is added to the accumulator, and the 128 least significant bits are serialized in little-endian order to form the tag.

### 2.5.1. Poly1305 Example and Test Vector

For our example, we will dispense with generating the one-time key using AES, and assume that we got the following keying material:
- s as a 128-bit number: 1bf54941aff6bf4afdb20dfb8a800301
- Clamped r as a number: 806d5400e52447c036d555408bed685.

For our message, we’ll use a short text:

```
Message to be Authenticated:
000  43 72 79 70 74 6f 67 72 61 70 68 69 63 20 46 72 75 6d 20 52 65 73 65 61 72 63 68 20 47 72 6f 75 70
016  72 75 6d 20 52 65 73 65 61 72 63 68 20 47 72 6f 75 70
032  75 70
```

Since Poly1305 works in 16-byte chunks, the 34-byte message divides into 3 blocks. In the following calculation, "Acc" denotes the accumulator and "Block" the current block:
2.6. Generating the Poly1305 key using ChaCha20

As said in Section 2.5, it is acceptable to generate the one-time Poly1305 pseudo-randomly. This section proposes such a method.

To generate such a key pair \((r,s)\), we will use the ChaCha20 block function described in Section 2.3. This assumes that we have a 256-bit session key for the MAC function, such as SK_ai and SK_ar in IKEv2, the integrity key in ESP and AH, or the client_write_MAC_key and server_write_MAC_key in TLS. Any document that specifies the use of Poly1305 as a MAC algorithm for some protocol must specify that 256 bits are allocated for the integrity key.
The method is to call the block function with the following parameters:
- The 256-bit session integrity key is used as the ChaCha20 key.
- The block counter is set to zero.
- The protocol will specify a 96-bit or 64-bit nonce. This MUST be unique per invocation with the same key, so it MUST NOT be randomly generated. A counter is a good way to implement this, but other methods, such as an LFSR are also acceptable. ChaCha20 as specified here requires a 96-bit nonce. So if the provided nonce is only 64-bit, then the first 32 bits of the nonce will be set to a constant number. This will usually be zero, but for protocols with multiple sender, it may be different for each sender, but should be the same for all invocations of the function with the same key by a particular sender.

After running the block function, we have a 512-bit state. We take the first 256 bits or the serialized state, and use those as the one-time Poly1305 key: The first 128 bits are clamped, and form "r", while the next 128 bits become "s". The other 256 bits are discarded.

Note that while many protocols have provisions for a nonce for encryption algorithms (often called Initialization Vectors, or IVs), they usually don’t have such a provision for the MAC function. In that case the per invocation nonce will have to come from somewhere else, such as a message counter.

2.7. AEAD Construction

Note: Much of the content of this document, including this AEAD construction is taken from Adam Langley’s draft ([agl-draft]) for the use of these algorithms in TLS. The AEAD construction described here is called AEAD_CHACHA20-POLY1305.

AEAD_CHACHA20-POLY1305 is an authenticated encryption with additional data algorithm. The inputs to AEAD_CHACHA20-POLY1305 are:
- A 256-bit key
- A 96-bit nonce - different for each invocation with the same key.
- An arbitrary length plaintext
- Arbitrary length additional data

The ChaCha20 and Poly1305 primitives are combined into an AEAD that takes a 256-bit key and 64-bit IV as follows:
- First the 96-bit nonce is constructed by prepending a 32-bit constant value to the IV. This could be set to zero, or could be derived from keying material, or could be assigned to a sender. It is up to the specific protocol to define the source for that 32-bit value.
Next, a Poly1305 one-time key is generated from the 256-bit key and nonce using the procedure described in Section 2.6.

The ChaCha20 encryption function is called to encrypt the plaintext, using the same key and nonce, and with the initial counter set to 1.

The Poly1305 function is called with the Poly1305 key calculated above, and a message constructed as a concatenation of the following:
- The additional data
- The length of the additional data in octets (as a 64-bit little-endian integer). TBD: bit count rather than octets? network order?
- The ciphertext
- The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little-endian integer). TBD: bit count rather than octets? network order?

Decryption is pretty much the same thing.

The output from the AEAD is twofold:
- A ciphertext of the same length as the plaintext.
- A 128-bit tag, which is the output of the Poly1305 function.

A few notes about this design:
1. The amount of encrypted data possible in a single invocation is $2^{32} - 1$ blocks of 64 bytes each, for a total of 247,877,906,880 bytes, or nearly 256 GB. This should be enough for traffic protocols such as IPsec and TLS, but may be too small for file and/or disk encryption. For such uses, we can return to the original design, reduce the nonce to 64 bits, and use the integer at position 13 as the top 32 bits of a 64-bit block counter, increasing the total message size to over a million petabytes (1,180,591,620,717,411,303,360 bytes to be exact).
2. Despite the previous item, the ciphertext length field in the construction of the buffer on which Poly1305 runs limits the ciphertext (and hence, the plaintext) size to $2^{64}$ bytes, or sixteen thousand petabytes (18,446,744,073,709,551,616 bytes to be exact).

2.7.1. Example and Test Vector for AEAD_CHACHA20-POLY1305

For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the AEAD_CHACHA20-POLY1305 function:
Plaintext:
000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6c|Ladies and Gentl
016 65 6d 65 6e 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73|emen of the clas
032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20 63|s of '99: If I c
048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20 6f|ould offer you o
064 6e 6l 79 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72 20|nly one tip for
080 74 68 65 20 66 75 74 75 74 75 72 65 2c 20 73 75|the future, suns
096 63 72 65 6e 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72|creen would be i
112 74 2e                                          |t.

AAD:
000 50 51 52 53 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7              PQRS........

Key:
000 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f|...............016 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f|...............032

IV:
000 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

32-bit fixed-common part:
000 07 00 00 00

Set up for generating poly1305 one-time key (sender id=7):
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
83828180 87868584 8b8a8988 8f8e8d8c
93929190 97969594 9b9a9998 9f9e9d9c
00000000 00000007 43424140 47464544

After generating Poly1305 one-time key:
252bac7b af47b42d 557ab609 8455e9a4
73d6e10a ebd97510 7875932a ff53d53e
decc7e2a b44dbbad e49c17d1 d8430bc9
8c94b7bc 8b7d4b4b 3927f67d 1669a432

Poly1305 Key:
000 7b ac 2b 25 2d b4 47 af 09 b6 7a 55 a4 e9 55 84|...+G...ZU.U.
016 0a 3e d6 73 10 75 d9 eb 2a 93 75 78 3e d5 53 ff|...s..*ux>.S.

Poly1305 r = 455e9a4057ab6080f47b42c052bac7b
Poly1305 s = ff53d53e7875932aebd9751073d6e10a
Keystream bytes:
4e:9e:cb:38:ac:8e:5e:2b:b8:dar:2:0f:fa:db:52:e8:
8e:db:41:c4:9c:a3:01:e7:27:e0:ac:ab:3b:44:ab:9:
15:38

Ciphertext:
000  d3  1a  8d  34  64  8e  60  db  7b  86  af  bc  53  ef  7e  c2 |...d.'{...S~-
016  a4  ad  ed  51  29  6e  08  fe  a9  e2  b5  a7  36  ee  62  d6 |...Q)n......6.b.
032  3d  be  a4  5e  8c  a9  e7  12  82  fa  fb  69  da  92  72  8b |=.^..g.....i..r.
048  1a  71  de  0a  9e  06  0b  29  05  d6  a5  b6  7e  cd  3b  36 |.q......-;6
064  92  dd  bd  7f  2d  77  8b  8c  98  03  ae  e3  28  09  1b  58 |..-w.......(.X
080  fa b3  24  e4  fa d6  75  94  55  85  80  8d  48  31  d7 bc |..$..u.U...H1..
096  3f  f4  de  f0  8e  4b  7a  9d  e5  76  d2  65  86  ce  c6  4b |.?....Kz.v.e...K
112  61 16 |

AEAD Construction for Poly1305:
000  50 51 52 53  5c  c0  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  0c  00  00  00 |PQRS.............
016  00  00  00  00  03  1a  8d  34  64  8e  60  db  7b  86  af  bc |......4d.'{...
032  53  ef  7e  c2  a4  ad  ed  51  29  6e  08  fe  a9  e2  b5  a7 |S.--.Q)n......
048  36  ee  62  d6  3d  be  a4  5e  8c  a9  e7  12  82  fa  fb  69 |6.b.=..^.g......1
064  da  92  72  8b  1a  71  de  0a  9e  06  0b  29  05  d6  a5  b6 |..r.q......)
080  7e  cd  3b  36  92  dd  bd  7f  2d  77  8b  8c  98  03  ae  e3 |.;6...w........
096  28 09 1b 58  fa b3  24  e4  fa d6  75  94  55  85  80  8d |(.X.$..u.U....
112  48 31 d7 bc  3f  f4  de  f0  8e  4b  7a  9d  e5  76  d2  65 |H1.?....Kz.v.e
128  86  ce  c6  4b  61 16 72  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00 |...Ka.r........

Tag:

3. Implementation Advice

Each block of ChaCha20 involves 16 move operations and one increment operation for loading the state, 80 each of XOR, addition and Roll operations for the rounds, 16 more add operations and 16 XOR operations for protecting the plaintext. Section 2.3 describes the ChaCha block function as "adding the original input words". This implies that before starting the rounds on the ChaCha state, it is copied aside only to be added in later. This would be correct, but it saves a few operations to instead copy the state and do the work
on the copy. This way, for the next block you don’t need to recreate
the state, but only to increment the block counter. This saves
approximately 5.5% of the cycles.

It is NOT RECOMMENDED to use a generic big number library such as the
one in OpenSSL for the arithmetic operations in Poly1305. Such
libraries use dynamic allocation to be able to handle any-sized
integer, but that flexibility comes at the expense of performance as
well as side-channel security. More efficient implementations that
run in constant time are available, one of them in DJB’s own library,
NaCl ([NaCl]).

4. Security Considerations

The ChaCha20 cipher is designed to provide 256-bit security.

The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages
are rejected with a probability of $1 - \frac{n}{(2^{102})}$ for a $16n$-byte
message, even after sending $2^{64}$ legitimate messages, so it is SUF-
CMA in the terminology of [AE].

Proving the security of either of these is beyond the scope of this
document. Such proofs are available in the referenced academic
papers.

The most important security consideration in implementing this draft
is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. Counters and LFSRs
are both acceptable ways of generating unique nonces, as is
encrypting a counter using a 64-bit cipher such as DES. Note that it
is not acceptable to use a truncation of a counter encrypted with a
128-bit or 256-bit cipher, because such a truncation may repeat after
a short time.

The Poly1305 key MUST be unpredictable to an attacker. Randomly
generating the key would fulfill this requirement, except that
Poly1305 is often used in communications protocols, so the receiver
should know the key. Pseudo-random number generation such as by
encrypting a counter is acceptable. Using ChaCha with a secret key
and a nonce is also acceptable.

The algorithms presented here were designed to be easy to implement
in constant time to avoid side-channel vulnerabilities. The
operations used in ChaCha20 are all additions, XORs, and fixed
rotations. All of these can and should be implemented in constant
time. Access to offsets into the ChaCha state and the number of
operations do not depend on any property of the key, eliminating the
chance of information about the key leaking through the timing of
cache misses.

For Poly1305, the operations are addition, multiplication and modulus, all on >128-bit numbers. This can be done in constant time, but a naive implementation (such as using some generic big number library) will not be constant time. For example, if the multiplication is performed as a separate operation from the modulus, the result will some times be under $2^{256}$ and some times be above $2^{256}$. Implementers should be careful about timing side-channels for Poly1305 by using the appropriate implementation of these operations.

5. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA considerations for this document.

6. Acknowledgements

None of the algorithms here are my own. ChaCha20 and Poly1305 were invented by Daniel J. Bernstein, and the AEAD construction was invented by Adam Langley.

Thanks to Robert Ransom and Ilari Liusvaara for their helpful comments and explanations.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


[FIPS-197]


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