

Raviyoyla v1

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Raviyoyla is a proposed scheme for CAESAR competition. CAESAR is Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness. Raviyoyla scheme is a combination of a stream cipher and keyed hash function designed around CAESAR call requirements. This document contains scheme specification, security goals, security analysis, features, design rationale and various statements. On the end is the source code encrypt part and a paper supporting theoretical side of the proposed scheme.

Chapter 2

Scheme specification

Stream cipher part of the scheme is an evolution of MAG v2¹. It combines three independent streams xored together to form one random stream (MAG v2 combines two to one). The random stream is xored with plain text to produce cipher text. See figure 2.1.

Fourth independent stream is processed with cipher text and additional data to get a tag which is appended to cipher text. See figure 2.2.

2.1 Raviyoyla scheme details

First, there are some definitions as prescribed in the call.

```
#define CRYPTO_KEYBYTES 32
#define CRYPTO_NPRIVBYTES 0
#define CRYPTO_NPUBBYTES 32
#define CRYPTO_ABYTES 64
```

The base of the scheme is an unsigned 64 bit array. The array has 1028 elements (*statelen*) initialised to zero.

```
uint64_t ignite[1028] = {0};
```

After array initialisation a key, a public message, a message length and additional data length are copied to *ignite* array as follows.

```
memcpy(&ignite[0], k, CRYPTO_KEYBYTES);
memcpy(&ignite[CRYPTO_KEYBYTES / 8], npub, CRYPTO_NPUBBYTES);
ignite[statelen - 1] = mlen;
ignite[statelen - 2] = adlen;
```

The *ignite* array is then processed with function *stir* section 2.2. When the array is modified by *stir*, it is sent with a char array to produce a random stream. The char array is the same length as a message length and it is set to zero.

```
stream_random = calloc(mlen, sizeof(unsigned char));
```

The arrays with array corresponding lengths are processed with *get_stream* function. That function is detailed in section 2.3. That way formed random stream char array is xored with message to produce cipher text. See figure 2.1.

The next step is to authenticate additional data and create cipher text (figure 2.2). The fourth part of *ignite* array is used to process additional data and cipher text. That part (*song*) is initialised in this way:

```
song = &ignite[768];
song_carry = ignite[statelen - 1];
```

Additional data and cipher text char arrays are xored to *song* array. Again, *song* array is treated as a circular array to accommodate arbitrary size of additional data and cipher text. The *song* array is modified by *revolve_all*

¹eSTREAM stream cipher competition; overview with latest cryptanalysis can be found here <http://dakhilalian.iut.ac.ir/pdf/c26.pdf>




Figure 2.1: Ignite array transformation (cipher part)

function section 2.4 every time when the end of *song* array is reached. The same apply on the end of additional data and cipher text xoring if the end of *song* array is not reached.

Finally, the song array is processed with *evolve* function section 2.5. The tag is extracted from evolved song array and appended to cipher text.

```
memmove(&c [ mlen] , &song[256 / 2] , CRYPTO_ABYTES);
```

The above procedure is for encryption part of the scheme. Decryption part is almost identical to the encryption part. Difference is:

- After initialisation additional data and cipher text are authenticated first and compared with provided tag. See figure 2.2.
- If calculated and provided tags are matched, message is produced by xoring cipher text and random stream. See figure 2.1.

The functions relationship is shown in figure 2.3. The C source code for encryption part is attached to Appendix A as a complement to the specification. The attached C source code alone can be considered as an algorithm formal description as well.

2.2 Function *stir*

Function *stir* has two input parameters:

- First is a pointer to unsigned 64 bit array
- Second is an integer array length (in this case 1028)

In C:

```
void stir (uint64_t * state , uint64_t statelen) {}
```

Inside the function there is two additional variables:

- An unsigned 64 bit mixer with initial value 6148914691236517205 which is binary 010101... . This value is a part of a cryptanalysis controversy see <http://dakhilalian.iut.ac.ir/pdff/C26.pdf>. In short, one argumentation party took mixer initial value to zero rendering all adding operation to nothing and consequentially showing weakness of the scheme.




Figure 2.2: Authentication part

- An unsigned 64 bit carry with initial value 1234567890123456789. Both values are arbitrary but above values shall be used in proposed scheme, in C:

```

const uint64_t mixer = 6148914691236517205; //010101...
uint64_t carry = 1234567890123456789;

```

Another three variables are counters and number of rounds (eight rounds); in C:

```
int i, j, rounds = 8;
```

After initialisation, a nested loop is used to modify content of passed array. Outer loop iterate via rounds and i. Inner loop iterates via array length and j. Inner loop mimic circular list via modulo operator in indexing; for example, if index exceeds array length the next access element is the first element of the array. In C that looks like:

```
state[(j+2)%statelen]
```

Inner loop goes through each element in array and modifies it by following rule. Second and third elements from right hand side of the element are compared. If second element is bigger than third, carry variable is updated

by xoring carry with first element from right hand side. If not carry is xored with first element flipped state. The element is modified by xoring the element with carry. Carry is then updated with addition of mixer. C code:

```
if (state[(j+2)%statelen]>state[(j+3)%statelen])
    carry ^= state[(j+1)%statelen];
else
    carry ^= ~state[(j+1)%statelen];

state[j] ^= carry;
carry += mixer;
```

The function does not have return value, it only modifies pointed array.

2.3 Function *get_stream*

The function definition is:

```
void get_stream(uint64_t * ignite, int statelen,
               char * stream_random, unsigned long long mlen)
```

The base array is split in four parts. First three parts (ping, pong and sing) are used to form random stream. Each part is an array of 256 elements (uint64_t) and a corresponding carry element. Split is done as follows:

```
ping = &ignite[0];
pong = &ignite[256];
sing = &ignite[512];
ping_carry = ignite[statelen - 4];
pong_carry = ignite[statelen - 3];
sing_carry = ignite[statelen - 2];
```

Each part element with corresponding carry is processed with *revolve_step* function section 2.4 and xored together to produce eight bytes of random stream.

```
three = revolve_step(ping, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &ping_carry)
        ^ revolve_step(pong, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &pong_carry)
        ^ revolve_step(sing, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &sing_carry);
memmove(stream_random + (i / 8), (uint64_t *) &three, 8);
```

This procedure is repeated until *stream_random* char array (the same length as a message) is filled.

2.4 Function *revolve_all* and *revolve_step*

The function *revolve* is very very similar to the *stir*.

```
void revolve_all(uint64_t * state, int statelen, uint64_t * carry){}
```

The difference is inclusion of pointer to the current carry as a variable. Also a mixer and adding operation are not present. There is only one loop and it goes through all elements in array once only. C code for modifying all array elements is:

```
if (state[(j+2)%statelen]>state[(j+3)%statelen])
    carry ^= state[(j+1)%statelen];
else
    carry ^= ~state[(j+1)%statelen];

state[j] ^= carry;
```

The function *revolve_step* is just one step of *revolve_all* function. Because of that a position of element for modification is passed as well.

```
uint64_t revolve_step(uint64_t * state, int i, int elen, uint64_t * carry)
```

Another difference is that function returns modified element as unsigned 64-bit integer.




Figure 2.3: Function hierarchy

```

if (state[(i+2)%elen] > state[(i+3)%elen])
    * carry ^= state[(i+1)%elen];
else
    * carry ^= ~state[(i+1)%elen];
state[i] ^= * carry;
return state[i];

```

As in *stir* function section 2.2 the circular list structure is used to enable arbitrary number of *revolve_step* steps (modulo array length).

2.5 Function *evolve*

The *evolve* function has two inputs only. That is a pointer to the array of unsigned 64 bit integers and the array length.

```
void evolve(uint64_t * state, int statelen){}
```

The *evolve* similarity with *stir* and *revolve* functions is use of circular list as means of accessing array. There is also nested loop where outer loop length is *i* and inner loop length is *i*. The differences are:

- Instead of using void pointer, unsigned char pointer is used for password, salt and hash.
- Parameters for the time and memory cost are 64 bit unsigned integers.

double of array length and inner loop length is equal to array length. length.

The element for modification and three array neighbour elements on right hand side are involved in three step procedure:

1. First and third neighbour are compared. If first neighbour is bigger than third; element for modification is xored with first neighbour otherwise it is modified with first neighbour flipped state.
2. Second and third neighbour are compared. If second neighbour is bigger than third; element for modification is xored with second neighbour otherwise it is modified with second neighbour flipped state.
3. If third neighbour is odd; element for modification is xored with third neighbour otherwise it is modified with third neighbour flipped state.

In C:

```

if (state[(j + 1) % statelen] > state[(j + 3) % statelen])
    state[j % statelen] ^= state[(j + 1) % statelen];
else
    state[j % statelen] ^= ~state[(j + 1) % statelen];

```

```
if (state[(j + 2) % statelen] > state[(j + 3) % statelen])
    state[j % statelen] ^= state[(j + 2) % statelen];
else
    state[j % statelen] ^= ~state[(j + 2) % statelen];

if (state[(j + 3) % statelen] % 2 == 1)
    state[j % statelen] ^= state[(j + 3) % statelen];
else
    state[j % statelen] ^= ~state[(j + 3) % statelen];
```

There is no return value for *evolve* function, only pointed array is modified.

Chapter 3

Security goals

goal	bits of security
confidentiality for the plain text	256
integrity for the plain text	128
integrity for the associated data	128
integrity for the public message number	128

Table 3.1: Security goals

There is no secret message number. If the one is required, than it can be put in the message specific position and treated as part of message. The whole security depends on the 256 bit key, Various integrities have 128 bit security due to the birthday paradox. Since the proposed scheme is stream cipher oriented, the public message number is used as a salt and shall not be reused. The public message reuse makes the proposed scheme insecure.

Chapter 4

Security analysis

The paper <http://dakhilalian.iut.ac.ir/pdf/C26.pdf> (mentioned in *stir* function section 2.2) provides analysis to the *stir* and *revolve* functions. The paper argues that previous attacks on *stir* function are superficial. For *revolve* function there is only one type of attack and apparently not applicable for all proposed schemes at that time, particularly not relevant to the MAG v2. That attack is also not relevant for hash constructs. Third function used in scheme *evolve* tries to emulate classical cellular automata (CA) with high cyclomatic complexity (see Appendix B).

Note that MAG versions are tree alike (one primitive different implementation), meaning MAG v1, v2 and v3 are totally different in design. The attack to one does not automatically translate to the other versions.

Basically, the scheme is based on a new class of functions presented in the paper appended to this submission (see Appendix B). Main attribute of that new class is: if input to the function is not fully specified the function description is exponentially complex. An obvious application of the new class is a stream cipher and hash function modelling.

The argumentation from the paper might be interpreted that the proposed scheme *is the random function* contrary to the today consensus on randomness.

Chapter 5

Features

- Being *the random function* (not just undistinguishable from the random function) argument is main feature of the proposed scheme.
- The function descriptions used in scheme are very simple.
- The performance should be significantly better than AES (at least a couple of times faster, see eSTREAM competition MAG v3 performance for example).
- The proposed scheme can be optimised using multiple CPU cores, because quite a few processes in the scheme can be run independently.

Chapter 6

Design rationale

As is mentioned in section 4, a various stream design approaches using Cyclomatic Complexity are used in the past (MAG v0, v1, v2 and v3). The only weakness (see <http://dakhilalian.iut.ac.ir/pdf/C26.pdf>) affecting v0 (the original submission) and v3 is the function *revolve* section 2.4. Easy fix is to use *stir* function instead *revolve* function in affected versions of MAG.

The MAG v2 was selected as a base for proposed scheme development because:

- The Yao's XOR lemma applies to the use of multiple independent streams, providing theoretical justification for design choice.
- Use of independent streams enables efficient parallel optimisation of the scheme (multi-core CPU future).

The *revolve* function in proposed scheme is still kept because it does not affect MAG v2 security (apparently no weakness was found yet) which is a base for proposed scheme. The second reason of keeping *revolve* function is that it is simpler than *stir* function. If weaknesses are found in *revolve* function use in the proposed scheme design it can be easily replaced with *stir* function.

The *evolve* function is a new construct and it is used for hashing purposes. It is multicolour (64 - bit) cellular automata with Cyclomatic Complexity of 2^{256} . It tries to emulate Wolfram's Rule 30. The details are in appendix B.

Since security goal is 256-bit security, all functions in the proposed scheme have at least 2^{256} Cyclomatic Complexity, hence 256 elements in working arrays. The number of rounds in the stir function is set to eight. It seems like the sweet spot. MAG v1 had only 1.5 rounds and keys with low entropy did not initialise working array properly.

The proposed scheme is invariant to the byte order in integers used. However compatibility between big and little endian systems needs attention.

There are no deliberately hidden weaknesses (back-door, etc.) in the proposed scheme.

Chapter 7

Intellectual property and consent

7.1 Patent status

The scheme is and will remain available worldwide on a royalty free basis, and the submitter/designer is unaware of any patent or patent application that covers the use or implementation of the submitted algorithm. If any of this information changes, the submitter will promptly (and within at most one month) announce these changes on the crypto-competitions mailing list.

7.2 Consent

The submitter hereby consents to all decisions of the CAESAR selection committee regarding the selection or non-selection of this submission as a second-round candidate, a third-round candidate, a finalist, a member of the final portfolio, or any other designation provided by the committee. The submitter understands that the committee will not comment on the algorithms, except that for each selected algorithm the committee will simply cite the previously published analyses that led to the selection of the algorithm. The submitter understands that the selection of some algorithms is not a negative comment regarding other algorithms, and that an excellent algorithm might fail to be selected simply because not enough analysis was available at the time of the committee decision. The submitter acknowledges that the committee decisions reflect the collective expert judgements of the committee members and are not subject to appeal. The submitter understands that if he disagrees with published analyses then he is expected to promptly and publicly respond to those analyses, not to wait for subsequent committee decisions. The submitter understands that this statement is required as a condition of consideration of this submission by the CAESAR selection committee

Appendix A

Encrypt part source code

Listing A.1: cryptoeadencrypt

```
#include "api.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void stir(uint64_t * state, int statelen)
{
    uint64_t mixer = 6148914691236517205;//010101...
    uint64_t carry = 1234567890123456789;
    int i, j, rounds = 8;

    for(i = 0; i < rounds; i++)
    {
        for(j = 0; j < statelen; j++)
        {
            if (state[(j+2)%statelen]>state[(j+3)%statelen])
                carry ^= state[(j+1)%statelen];
            else
                carry ^= ~state[(j+1)%statelen];

            state[j] ^= carry;
            carry += mixer;
        }
    }
}

uint64_t revolve_step(uint64_t * state, int i, int elen, uint64_t * carry)
{
    if (state[(i+2)%elen]>state[(i+3)%elen])
        * carry ^= state[(i+1)%elen];
    else
        * carry ^= ~state[(i+1)%elen];

    state[i] ^= * carry;
    return state[i];
}

void get_stream(uint64_t * ignite, int statelen,
               char * stream_random, unsigned long long mlen)
```

```

{
    uint64_t * ping, * pong, * sing;
    uint64_t ping_carry, pong_carry, sing_carry;
    uint64_t three, i;
    uint64_t end = mlen / 8;

    ping = &ignite[0];
    pong = &ignite[256];
    sing = &ignite[512];
    ping_carry = ignite[statelen - 4];
    pong_carry = ignite[statelen - 3];
    sing_carry = ignite[statelen - 2];

    for(i = 0; i < end; i++)
    {
        three = revolve_step(ping, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &ping_carry)
            ^ revolve_step(pong, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &pong_carry)
            ^ revolve_step(sing, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &sing_carry);
        memmove(stream_random + (i / 8), (uint64_t *) &three, 8);
    }

    if((end % 8) > 0)
    {
        three = revolve_step(ping, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &ping_carry)
            ^ revolve_step(pong, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &pong_carry)
            ^ revolve_step(sing, i, (statelen / 4) - 1, &sing_carry);
        memmove(stream_random + (i / 8), (uint64_t *) &three, end % 8);
    }
}

void revolve_all(uint64_t * state, int elen, uint64_t * carry)
{
    int i;

    for(i = 0; i < elen; i++)
    {
        if(state[(i+2)%elen] > state[(i+3)%elen])
            * carry ^= state[(i+1)%elen];
        else
            * carry ^= ~state[(i+1)%elen];

        state[i] ^= * carry;
    }
}

void evolve(uint64_t * state, int statelen)
{
    int i, j;

    for(i = 0; i < statelen; i++)
    {
        for(j = 0; j < statelen; j++)
        {
            if(state[(j + 1) % statelen] > state[(j + 3) % statelen])
                state[j % statelen] ^= state[(j + 1) % statelen];
            else

```

```

        state[j % statelen] ^= ~state[(j + 1) % statelen];

    if (state[(j + 2) % statelen] > state[(j + 3) % statelen])
        state[j % statelen] ^= state[(j + 2) % statelen];
    else
        state[j % statelen] ^= ~state[(j + 2) % statelen];

    if (state[(j + 3) % statelen] % 2 == 1)
        state[j % statelen] ^= state[(j + 3) % statelen];
    else
        state[j % statelen] ^= ~state[(j + 3) % statelen];
    }
}

int crypto_aead_encrypt
(
    unsigned char *c, unsigned long long *clen,
    const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
    const unsigned char *ad, unsigned long long adlen,
    const unsigned char *nsec,
    const unsigned char *npub,
    const unsigned char *k
)
{
    int statelen = 1028;
    uint64_t ignite[1028] = {0};
    uint64_t * song;
    uint64_t song_carry;
    uint64_t i, j;
    char * stream_random, * song_char;

    memmove(&ignite[0], k, CRYPTO_KEYBYTES );
    memmove(&ignite[4], npub, CRYPTO_NPUBBYTES);
    ignite[statelen - 1] = mlen;
    ignite[statelen - 2] = adlen;
    stir(ignite, statelen);

    stream_random = (char *) calloc ( mlen, sizeof(char) );
    if (stream_random==NULL)
    {
        printf ("Error allocating requested memory");
        exit (1);
    }
    stream_random = calloc(mlen, sizeof(unsigned char));

    get_stream(ignite, statelen, stream_random, mlen);

    for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++)
        c[i] = m[i] ^ stream_random[i];

    free(stream_random);

    song = &ignite[768];
    song_carry = ignite[statelen - 1];
    song_char = (char *)song;

```



```

for(i = 0; i < adlen; i++)
{
    song_char[i % 2048] ^= ad[i];
    if(i % 2047 == 0 && i > 0) revolve_all(song, 256, &song_carry);
}
for(i = adlen, j = 0; i < (adlen + mlen); i++, j++)
{
    song_char[i % 2048] ^= c[j];
    if(i % 2047 == 0) revolve_all(song, 256, &song_carry);
}
if(i % 2047 > 0) revolve_all(song, 256, &song_carry);

evolve(song, 256);

memmove(&c[m], &song[256 / 2], CRYPTO_ABYTES);

return 0;
}

int crypto_aead_decrypt(
    unsigned char *m,unsigned long long *mlen,
    unsigned char *nsec,
    const unsigned char *c,unsigned long long clen,
    const unsigned char *ad,unsigned long long adlen,
    const unsigned char *npub,
    const unsigned char *k
)
{
    /* ...
    ... the code for the cipher implementation goes here,
    ... generating a plaintext m[0],m[1],...,m[*mlen-1]
    ... and secret message number nsec[0],nsec[1],...
    ... from a ciphertext c[0],c[1],...,c[clen-1]
    ... and associated data ad[0],ad[1],...,ad[adlen-1]
    ... and public message number npub[0],npub[1],...
    ... and secret key k[0],k[1],...
    ...*/
    return 0;
}

```

Appendix B

Supporting paper

A new kind of complexity

Rade Vuckovac

Abstract

A new class of functions is presented. The structure of the algorithm, particularly the selection criteria (branching), is used to define the fundamental property of the new class. The most interesting property of the new functions is that instances are easy to compute but if input to the function is vague the description of a function is exponentially complex. This property puts a new light on randomness especially on the random oracle model with a couple of practical examples of random oracle implementation. Consequently, there is a new interesting viewpoint on computational complexity in general.

1 Introduction

The structured program theorem, also known as Böhm-Jacopini theorem is one of the premises for this paper. The theorem shows an ability of the algorithm or a program implementing that algorithm to compute any computable function combining only the three algorithmic structures. These structures are:

- The tasks in the program are done one after another one (sequential order of execution)
- The program can branch to a different path of execution depending on some statement evaluation result (selection criteria)
- Repeating some task until an evaluation of some statement is satisfied (iteration)

The branching or selection criteria structure and its usage defines the new proposed class of functions. It is assumed that structured program theorem holds and that usage of the three structures is Turing complete. More precisely, it is assumed that further reduction from three structures to two structures (excluding branching) is impossible. In other words the selection criteria cannot be effectively replaced with a combination of the other two structures.

The second premise is the analysis of the branching structure in software metrics done by McCabe [1]. The main result of McCabe's work is the notion of Cyclomatic Complexity (CC). The flow chart of the above mentioned structures is used to count the individual execution paths that the program can take. The CC is mainly used as software testing metric. It evaluates a requirement of how

many testing cases are needed for a piece of software. In the majority of cases the relation between branching and individual paths is exponential, meaning that if the number of branching in a program increases then the number of individual paths which the program can execute doubles for every added branching.

The combination of the two above notions can lead to an extraordinary case. The program can be written with a non restricted number of branching (n) implying an exponential growth of the number of paths that the program can take through execution (2^n). Additionally, the theory of algorithms demands that the formal description of an algorithm shall include every possible case it can take through execution.

“Typically, when an algorithm is associated with processing information, data is read from an input source, written to an output device, and/or stored for further processing. Stored data is regarded as part of the internal state of the entity performing the algorithm. In practice, the state is stored in one or more data structures.

For some such computational process, the algorithm must be rigorously defined: specified in the way it applies in all possible circumstances that could arise. *That is, any conditional steps must be systematically dealt with, case-by-case; the criteria for each case must be clear (and computable)* [emphasis added].

Because an algorithm is a precise list of precise steps, the order of computation will always be critical to the functioning of the algorithm. Instructions are usually assumed to be listed explicitly, and are described as starting "from the top" and going "down to the bottom", an idea that is described more formally by flow of control.” [3]

That means that an algorithms with a high CC cannot be practically described because the number of execution paths increases exponentially. On the other hand, the instances of such an algorithm can be easily computed because the increase of the number of branching in the program incurs only polynomial cost.

This extraordinary case needs more thorough clarifications:

- It is not clear what the irreducible number of branching means. There is still a possibility that individual execution paths of an algorithm are actually identical transformations.
- Although CC shows exponential dependency between the number of branching and the number of execution paths, a possibility remains that the relationship between the selection criteria and the paths doubling numbers can be reduced to an acceptable level. Indeed, there is a suggestion to avoid high CC software metric: the first is to rewrite a program in question with reduced use of branching, and the second is to split the program in more manageable pieces [4].

These concerns and other relevant discussions are explored through $3n+1$ problem (section 2) and Wolfram’s rule 30 (section 3). Section 4 summarises the

new function features and speculates on the impacts on randomness and P/NP classes.

2 Programming take on $3n+1$ problem

2.1 $3n+1$ problem

The $3n+1$ problem is ideal for exploring the relationship between the algorithm's selection criteria and the CC. One reason for this is that the $3n+1$ problem is extensively studied and a lot of details about the problem are well established. Another reason is that the selection criteria are essential part of the problem description. The problem is very simple to state: take any positive integer, if the integer is even divide that integer with 2, if the integer is odd multiply the integer with 3 and add 1. Repeat the procedure until the result is 1. The problem is to decide if all positive integers reach 1. One step of the $3n+1$ problem is shown below in modular notation [6].

$$f(n) = \begin{cases} n/2 & \text{if } n \equiv 0 \pmod{2} \\ 3n + 1 & \text{if } n \equiv 1 \pmod{2} \end{cases}$$

It is possible to skip the evaluation if the integer is even after $3n+1$ operation and proceed with the operation $n/2$ because 3 times odd integer plus one is even. That is also an example of how CC of an algorithm can be reduced. Below is the optimised version which will be used throughout the rest of the paper.

$$f(n) = \begin{cases} n/2 & \text{if } n \equiv 0 \pmod{2} \\ (3n + 1)/2 & \text{if } n \equiv 1 \pmod{2} \end{cases}$$

The $3n+1$ problem flow chart is shown in figure 1.

2.2 $3n+1$ and Cyclomatic Complexity

In this section the CC of $3n+1$ algorithm is explored. As mentioned in section 1 CC is software metric. That software metric measures how many paths the program can take through the execution. It uses graph theory to count individual execution paths. The formula for CC is as follows: $\nu(G) = e - n + 2$ where e and n are amounts of edges and nodes contained in the algorithm flow graph. ν is cyclomatic number and G means that the complexity is the function of algorithm flow graph [4]. Applying this formula to a particular algorithm is a not straight forward exercise. One of simpler ways is counting the binary decision predicates p . The formula for this approach is $\nu(G) = p + 1$. The figure 2 shows the $3n+1$ algorithm doing two steps. Using a simpler method the three binary branching can be identified, therefore $\nu(G) = 3 + 1$ and indeed there are four individual paths the $3n+1$ algorithm can take in two steps. It is evident from figure 2 that every $3n+1$ step will double CC. That means after doing several $3n+1$ steps the system starts to be very complex from the software testing perspective.




Figure 1: $3n+1$ flow chart with optimised $(3n+1)/2$ step

2.3 $3n+1$ Preliminaries

A few details about $3n+1$ problem are well known and mentioned here [6], some are listed for further discussion:

- The experimental data confirms that numbers up to $\approx 2^{60}$ are reaching one [8].
- The lower bound of how many natural numbers reach one is shown by [5]. For any sequence of natural numbers in the interval $[1, x]$ the number of naturals reaching one in corresponding interval is $> x^{0.84}$.
- A parity sequence for each natural number as an input is unique and that is true even if not all natural numbers are reaching one. The parity sequence is formed by putting 1 or 0 in the sequence, depending on what operation is performed in the particular step. In other words if the branching in figure 1 “is n odd?” is NO put 0 in the parity sequence and if it is YES put 1.




Figure 2: two steps in $3n+1$ algorithm (binary tree resemblance)

2.4 $3n+1$ as composite function

The composite function nature of $3n+1$ problem comes from the parity sequence. For example if $n = 13$ the parity sequence for that input will be 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0. In the same manner a composite function $h(n)$ can be composed, for example $h(13) = f \circ g \circ g \circ f \circ g \circ g \circ g = 1$ where $f(n) = (3n + 1)/2$ and $g(n) = n/2$. It is obvious that the parity sequence pattern and the composite function pattern are identical. That should be expected because the parity sequence is the description of how a natural number is transformed under the $3n+1$ rule.

If the natural numbers and their corresponding parity sequences have the bijective relationship, and that appears to be true even the 1 is not periodicity revolving point [6], then the natural numbers and their corresponding composite function are bijective as well. That is based on the fact that the pattern of the parity sequence is identical to the pattern of the composite function for the same natural number. *Therefore every natural number has a unique composite function $h(n)$ to map a natural number to a number where a period occurs under rule $3n+1$.*

2.5 $3n+1$ as encoding system

A parity sequence or $h(n)$ pattern can be considered as binary encoding for every natural number reaching 1 under $3n+1$ rule. For example for the number 13 its binary representation is 1101. In $3n+1$ binary world encoding for 13 is FG string $fggf ggg$. The decoding is done by applying the rule $3n+1$ backwards without the need for evaluating “if odd or even”. Just start from one and read the FG string backwards. If the character is g apply function $g(n) = 2n$ and go to next character. If the character is f apply function $f(n) = (2n - 1)/3$ and go to the next character. When all characters are read the final number is the decoded number. From traditional binary and parity encodings two languages can be defined:

1. The binary language $L_{0,1}$ is written by $\{0, 1\}$ alphabet. The members of $L_{0,1}$ set are the binary encodings of all natural numbers reaching 1 under rule $3n+1$ (n'). The ratio size of the set is $\geq n^{0.84}$ [5].
2. The parity language $L_{f,g}$ is written by $\{f, g\}$ alphabet. The members of $L_{f,g}$ set are the parity sequences of n' . The size of $L_{f,g}$ is the same as the size of $L_{0,1}$.

Although the amounts of the words forming languages $L_{0,1}$ and $L_{f,g}$ are equal the words explaining the same object differ in length between languages. For example encodings for number 13 are:

1. In $L_{0,1}$ language the encoding is 1101; size of the word is 4.
2. In $L_{f,g}$ language the encoding is $fggf ggg$; size of the word is 7.

It is obvious that encodings from language $L_{f,g}$ can be compressed, but compression can not go below complexity of the language $L_{0,1}$. This means that *the complexity of language $L_{f,g}$ ($3n+1$ encoding) is greater or equal to complexity of language $L_{0,1}$ (optimal binary encoding).*

A significant implication is that the $3n+1$ function description depends on input in an unusual way. The input is not just an ordinary variable but it is determinant of how a particular transformation (from input towards one) is composed. If the if else structure is used in $3n+1$ rule then the composite function description for all natural numbers has at least sub exponential growth of $n^{0.84}$.¹

2.6 $3n+1$ as a random function?

Random oracle is an abstraction used to model security protocols and schemes. Basically random oracle is an imaginary machine which upon an input to oracle, randomly draws a function from a set of all function possible and with that function an output is calculated and returned. A simple model can be used

¹Note that first $\approx 2^{58}$ natural numbers are reaching one and even if the some numbers do not reach one the corresponding parities are unique.

as an example: On input 0 flip fair coin and record the resulting tail/head occurrences as a truly random binary string; continue with same procedure for inputs 1, 00, 01, 10, 11, 000... (see table 1).

binary input	corresponding string
0	truly random string 1
1	truly random string 2
00	truly random string 3
01	truly random string 4
...	...

Table 1: Mapping using random function

The table 1 is then used in proving various security systems (see [10] for details). It is apparent that the table 1 is not practical by means of storage and access to intended entry. In practice random oracle is replaced with cryptographically secure hash with undefined security consequences. The work of [11] argues that random oracle modelling is essentially unsound; a practical implementation of replacing a random oracle in proven secure scheme results in an insecure scheme.

An interesting property defined in [11] is a notion of correlation intractability. The correlation intractability is the resistance to put some relation between inputs and outputs on some mapping. It is easy to see that random oracle is resistant to correlation (table 1) because of flipping fair coin. For potential replacement, and that is single functions or function assemblies, correlation intractability property can not be guaranteed. The reasoning behind is that mapping description is shorter than allowed input description used by adversary, therefore the correlation between input and output must exist and that can not be expected from efficient and fully described function or function assembly to behave randomly. Quotes from [11]

Informal Theorem 1.1 There exist no correlation intractable function ensembles... The proof of the above negative result relies on the fact that the description of the function is shorter than the input used in the attack.

Correlation Intractability. In this section we present and discuss the difficulty of defining the intuitive requirement that a function ensemble behaves like a random oracle even when its description is given. We first comment that an obvious over-reaching definition, which amounts to adopting the pseudo-random requirement of [12], fails poorly. That is, we cannot require that an (efficient) algorithm that is given the description of the function cannot distinguish its input-output behaviour from the one of a random function, because the function description determines its input-output behaviour.

Despite that $3n+1$ shall apply for random oracle replacement. One line of

argument can go along the fact that $3n+1$ is perceived as a hard problem. Quotes from [13]p4 and p17:

The track record on the $3x + 1$ problem so far suggests that this is an extraordinarily difficult problem, completely out of reach of present day mathematics. Here we will only say that part of the difficulty appears to reside in an inability to analyze the pseudorandom nature of successive iterates of $T(x)$, which could conceivably encode very difficult computational problems.

The iterates of the shift function are completely unpredictable in the ergodic theory sense. Given a random starting point, predicting the parity of the n -th iterate for any n is a “coin flip” random variable.

One obvious advantage of replacing table 1 with table 2 is that entries in $3n+1$ parity table can be produced *deterministically*. Finding any pattern or structure in table 2 may open a way to attack the $3n+1$ problem. A similar argument is made with hardness of integer factoring and consequent factoring use in asymmetric encryption.

The second line of replacing random oracle with parity sequences is complexity of the $3n+1$ in terms of CC and composite function model. If $3n+1$ is considered as composite function, the form without specifying input looks like formula 1 where $f \clubsuit g$ means depending on input use function f or g . That can not be considered as *a fully described function*. Only with an input the formula can make sense (and can be executed).

$$(f \clubsuit g) \circ (f \clubsuit g) \circ (f \clubsuit g) \dots \tag{1}$$

The argumentation can also go along the line input and function description equality. As is shown in subsection 2.5 input language and composite function (parity) language for $3n+1$ are of equal complexity. The configuration where input description and function description are of the same length, is actually listed as a possible case where random function can be replaced (see restricted correlation intractability section [11]). Although that case is considered as inefficient, as is table 1 for example (function description is actually input/output description). However table 2 is practical because entries can be calculated as is needed (full knowledge of all mappings are not necessary).

Here is how the $3n+1$ implementation of the hash function (random function replacement) may look: Let the input n be a word with at least 256 bits in length. Treat n as an unsigned integer. Process n by the algorithm figure 1. Form the binary sequence (parity) by recording 1 when “yes” and 0 when “no” is answered to the question “is n odd?”. Stop when parity is 128 bit long. The game is to find n' in the way to produce identical first 128 bits in parity sequence as n does (a collision). The search for collision is needed for a specific input, because the powers of two (32, 64, 128...) inputs will produce parities of zeros (collisions are trivial, see entry 8 in table 2 for example). Because there is only formula 1 and target parity for someone who wants to find the match for that parity, the task is impossible excluding exhaustive search.

n	corresponding parity
...	...
7	111010001000
8	000
9	10111010001000
...	...

Table 2: $3n+1$ parity mapping

2.7 $3n+1$ inherently serial problem?

An Inherently serial problem is when some algorithms can not be split into chunks and executed concurrently to reduce execution time. The reason is that the next execution step in such an algorithm depends on previous step result [19]. A formal attempt to define sequential nature of algorithm with example can be found here [18]. Because $3n+1$ algorithm is essentially a composite function, it is evident that the $3n+1$ algorithm step fundamentally depends on the result from previous step, see figures 2 and 1. That means that the $3n+1$ algorithm as is formulated in figure 1 can not be divided and executed in parallel and be more efficient than serial execution.

Computational irreducibility (CI) notion introduced by Wolfram [22] is closely related to serial phenomena in algorithms. CI in the cellular automata (CA) world means that the fastest way to have knowledge of what a particular CA is doing is to run that CA. The same observation can be applied to the $3n+1$ algorithm. CI is more obvious in $3n+1$ than in other systems because $3n+1$ is a composite function with consequence of inherent non parallelism.

2.8 $3n+1$ and reductions

It was tried before to show that the $3n+1$ problem is intractable. One example is here [9]. The main argument of that work goes on showing that the $3n+1$ solution has to be infinitely complex, using Solomon-Kolmogorov-Chaitin (SKC) complexity as an argument [14]. It relies on the fact that every $3n+1$ transformation is unique and if we were to represent all of them, the only remaining option would be to list them all and consequently that option is obviously infeasible. It is similar reasoning to the one from section 2.5. The problem with either reasoning is the possibility that $3n+1$ inquiries might be calculated by some algorithm other than algorithm shown in figure 1 and furthermore that the other algorithm can be fundamentally different. It is impossible to know how that algorithm may look anyhow a couple of important properties can be defined:

- *low CC*; Only algorithms without using branching structure can be considered as candidates.
- *efficiency*; There are algorithms with low CC see figure 3 for example. The execution time of that algorithm depends on the oracle proposing

the fg string (as shown in subsection 2.5). One option for getting the answer from that algorithm is that the oracle goes through an exhaustive search to match fg string with output 1 (if $3n+1$ conjecture holds). To be efficient it is required from the candidate algorithm to produce a matching fg string by evaluating input n in P time.

If both above requirements are met by the candidate algorithm, then the apparent CC of $3n+1$ can be reduced in P time. The algorithm on presented input n can predict the branching fg string without using branching structure. Consequently selection programming structure can be replaced by a combination of sequence and iteration without significant cost (P time). In that case the structural programming theorem [2] needs revision.




Figure 3: $3n+1$ flow chart with Do-While structure (looping)

3 About Wolfram's rule 30

3.1 Rule 30 complexity

The Rule 30 is probably one of the most represented rules in the Wolfram's NKS book [20]. The definitions of rule 30 are listed below:

- Boolean form is [16] $p \text{ Xor } (q \text{ Or } r)$
- English description [17] :

“Look at each cell and its right-hand neighbor. If both of these were white on the previous step, then take the new color of the cell to be whatever the previous color of its left-hand neighbor was. Otherwise, take the new color to be opposite of that”.
- Visual description and example is shown in figure 4.

The main features of the Rule 30 are chaotic behaviour and randomness. Both features are accomplished by an apparently simple rule and with an input with only one black cell - see figure 4. Quote from NKS book [20] pages 27-28.

“The picture shows what happens when one starts with just one black cell and then applies this rule over and over again. And what one sees is something quite startling—and probably the single most surprising scientific discovery I have ever made. Rather than getting a simple regular pattern as we might expect, the cellular automaton instead produces a pattern that seems extremely irregular and complex. But where does this complexity come from? We certainly did not put it into the system in any direct way when we set it up. For we just used a simple cellular automaton rule, and just started from a simple initial condition containing a single black cell.”

That observation is mentioned numerous times and is not entirely correct on both accounts (simple rule, one black cell as input). Let us use figure 4 for example.

- The first row shows the input and it is *43 bits long* with 42 white cells and one black. Instead talking of only one black cell input, emphasis should be on low entropy of that input. Also it should be explained how entropy of the input is relevant to the rule 30 process, because the configuration with one black cell has the same probability of occurring as any other configuration.
- The English description of the rule already mentioned is actually the clue to chaotic / random behaviour. The description is as follows: if something is true do that else do something different. It is exactly the same structure already seen in the $3n+1$ problem. Considering that, rule 30 can be considered as composite function in the same fashion as $3n+1$. The difference between $3n+1$ and rule 30 is that the rule 30 update of cell depends on outputs of neighbouring cells as well. Therefore it is trickier to calculate CC of rule 30 algorithm. A short-cut to estimating CC is to assume one branching per row evolution. Since rule 30 (figure 4) is iterated 21 times, the amount of possible execution paths for one cell is 2^{21} . From the software testing perspective anything over 2^{10} is practically non testable [4].

Consequently, it is not correct to brand rule 30 as a simple program while at the same time it has an inherently high level of CC.

3.2 Rule 30 function description

Although the rule 30 algorithm is fairly simple, its function description is certainly complex. The reason for this is that a particular input and particular number of iterations actually define which composite function is going to be executed at the time. Unlike the $3n+1$ case where input alone determines the number of iterations and consequently CC, the rule 30 CC depends on input and the number of iterations. Quantifying rule 30 CC is shown below.

Let ln be the length of the input ($ln = 43$ figure 4) and li be the number of iterations ($li = 21$ figure 4). If $li \leq ln$ CC depends on li , and the number of paths $\nu(G)$ that the algorithm can take is $\nu(G) = 2^{li}$. In the case $li > ln$ the number of paths is $\nu(G) = 2^{ln}$. The reason for that is that the entropy of the number of paths is bounded by entropy of input. Therefore the number of paths that the rule 30 algorithm can take through execution is:

$$\nu(G) = \begin{cases} \nu(G) = 2^{li} & \text{if } li > ln \\ \nu(G) = 2^{ln} & \text{if } ln > li \end{cases}$$

This means that if input length is smaller than number of iteration, CC depends on input only as it is the case with $3n+1$. Wolfram in his NKS [20] uses empirical methods to argue on some rule 30 attributes. For example empirical data shows that the period of rule 30 has an exponential growth in relation to input, which indicates that above assertion of exponential growth is true.




Figure 4: rule 30, example of evolution and rules of transformation, image copied from [15]

3.3 Rule 30 as hash function

Having the same algorithm structure as $3n+1$, rule 30 is also a candidate for the hash function. There is a proposal which appeared on sci.crypt [21]

“Let length of constant c be a desired length of a hash. Constant c can be arbitrary chosen. For example if 128 bits hash is required the constant c may easily be 128 zeros. The string s for hashing is then concatenated to the constant c to form a starting row r for rule 30; $r = c + s$. The row r is then evolved twice row length. For example if $c = 128$ bits in length and $s = 128$ bits in length then evolution is performed 512 times (column length is 512). Now the part (length of c) of last row serves as a hash. From above example the first 128 bits of 512th row is the hash h of the string s .”

The two major points raised in the discussion are the efficiency of algorithm and the choice of c to be string of zeros. Even though the proposed hash is not practical (quadratic in nature) it is still in P . Constant c instead of zeros should employ some pseudo-random string such as π number sequence to avoid short cycle of rule 30.

3.4 Rule 30 reduction

Rule 30 apparently satisfies two requirements discussed in subsection 2.8: low CC and efficiency. Both requirements for rule 30 are apparently satisfied by use of boolean form instead English form (subsection 3.1).

Determining branching structure presence in CA is not an easy task. For example, Wolfram rule 110 is Turing complete [23] and it has to accommodate use of if/else structure somehow (the structured programming theorem [2]). On the other hand it is not entirely clear how the 110 compiler can be employed for usual programming tasks including branching [7]. However the branching structure of rule 110 appears in English description [23] as well.

“The values are updated in the following way: 0s are changed to 1s at all positions where the value to the right is a 1, while 1s are changed to 0s at all positions where the values to the left and right are both 1.”

It is assumed that the boolean form and the English form of rule 30 are equal when quantifying CC. Another argument for that is: a tracing of rule 30 program execution paths produces the same binary tree structure as CC structure in figure 2. Which path is going to be executed depends entirely on the rule 30 input. Steps through rule 30 evolution can not be skipped. Even though the branching structure is not explicitly present in rule 30 boolean implementation, CC structure is present.

Therefore rule 30 (and for that matter rule 110, game of life ...) shall be analysed as a composite function with exponential description complexity growth w.t.r. to the input growth.

From there it is easy to argue irreducibility of rule 30 because of basic property of composite function, the output of one function determines input to other. Any reduction in function composition will mean reduction of branching structure. In case of rule 30, the output of the previous function determines the input *and selection* of the next function in the composite function chain. That detail prevents any short-cut execution path through algorithm.

4 Conclusion

4.1 Summary

As is noted in the introduction, the whole discussion is about three notions:

1. Structured Programming Theorem; particularly treating branching as basic structure in programming.
2. Cyclomatic Complexity; exponential dependence between branching and number of execution paths a program can take. Basically every branching potentially doubles number of paths.
3. Formal description of an algorithm; requirement that every branching in algorithm shall be fully defined.

The first option is: one or more of above do not hold. The second option is: all above notions hold and there exists a program without any knowledge of output behaviour before input is presented. The discussion from this paper sees the second option as a true. The main arguments for this are:

- The $3n+1$ parity sequence can be used as encoding system, see subsection 2.5. The argument is that $3n+1$ encoding alias function description can not be simpler than standard binary encoding of an input.
- The $3n+1$ algorithm description exponential growth can be reduced only if branching structure can be reduced to sequential and iteration programming structure in polynomial time. See subsections 2.8 and 3.4.
- The random oracle framework provides the definition of correlation intractability and how that requirement can not be obtained by single function or function assembly (see quote subsection 2.6). Contrary to that notion $3n+1$ algorithm looks like: $(select\ for\ g) \circ (select\ for\ g) \circ (select\ for\ g) \dots$. It is apparent that function description without specific input is not present, and that the input actually defines function composition. Therefore there is the case when input description and function description have the same complexity. That case satisfies the correlation intractability requirement (subsection 2.6).

Other arguments are various empirical findings, for example rule 30 is used as random number generator in Wolfram's Mathematica.

The common features of $3n+1$ and rule 30 are:

- Composed from two distinctive functions f and g that are not commutative $f \circ g \neq g \circ f$.
- Cyclomatic Complexity raise with every branching step see subsection 3.2
- Steps in program execution path are one of the function f or g
- Probability of executing f or g in next step is 0.5

See Appendix A for another practical implementation of above features.

4.2 Randomness and simple arithmetic?

As is discussed in subsection 2.6 the proposition is to exchange tables 1 and 2 without losing any of the random oracle properties. The similarity between tables is: Both tables are impractical if used in tabular form. There is a storage problem (for example how to store 2^{128} entries ? and seek time cost). It is easy to see that random oracle table can not be compressed because the second column is by design true random. On the opposite side of tabular representation spectrum is binary encoding (table 3). If input is given in the left column of the binary table it is easy to calculate corresponding entry in the right column and vice versa. This means that the tabular form is not needed (easily calculated/-compressed) because it is easy to calculate entries both ways.

n	binary encoding
1	1
2	10
3	11
4	100
...	...

Table 3: binary encoding

Because $3n+1$ can be used as encoding system (subsection 2.5), the compression of table 2 is not an issue.

Now it is time to see how the proposition from subsection 2.6 reflects on parity and binary encoding table:

- Binary table is not affected if only part of the string in the right hand column is provided. For example, if the question is to find corresponding entries for binary string beginning with 10, just appending arbitrary suffix to 10 and decoding that string will find entry on the left hand side column..
- The parity table in the case when only a partial string in the right hand column is provided can not be calculated or compressed. The simple reason is that entries can be calculated only with complete input. Anything else faces the ambiguous prospect of $(f \clubsuit g) \circ (f \clubsuit g) \circ (f \clubsuit g) \dots$ where $f \clubsuit g$ means depending on input use function f or use function g .

The question is: can observation of entries in parity table (table 2) provide any means of compressing that table? The answer is no, because the branching structure of algorithm prevents any type of Solomon-Kolgomorov-Chaitin (SKC) reductions, even though the table is deterministic in nature. In other words the data in the parity table ought to be random. Rule 30 sequences are in the same category. It is remarkable that randomness can be now interpreted as inability of reducing selection criteria programming structure. Translated to random oracle vocabulary that is notion of correlation intractability.

4.3 P and NP

The $3n+1$ proposal for collision resistance (subsection 2.6) can serve as P versus NP discussion as well. The game is to find input x (natural number) and with that x to produce the parity string p_x . Parity $p_x = s||a$ is the concatenation of given string s and arbitrary string a . Only one constraint is $l_x = 2l_s$, where l_x is the binary length of x and l_s is the binary length of the given string s .

For example the given string in C language notation is *char s = "DoesPequalsNp?"* has the binary length $l_x = 14 * 8$. The task is to find natural number x with binary length $l_x = 2 * 14 * 8$ and with sequence *char p_x = "DoesPequalsNp?..."*.

First of all, nothing guaranties that any of the natural numbers 224 bit long will produce required parity sequence.

Secondly, because matching parity is not fully defined calculating x from s is impossible. The reasons are:

- To compose the transformation and do the calculation full knowledge of input is needed, because only input defines function composition.
- Trying to observe the mapping of natural numbers to corresponding parities and hoping to find some pattern/reduction is futile because the selection criteria programming structure can not be reduced.

$(f \clubsuit g) \circ (f \clubsuit g) \circ (f \clubsuit g)$
$f \circ f \circ f$
$f \circ f \circ g$
$f \circ g \circ f$
$f \circ g \circ g$
$g \circ f \circ f$
$g \circ f \circ g$
$g \circ g \circ f$
$g \circ g \circ g$

Table 4: The complexity of $3n+1$ function composition grows exponentially; example of function 3 steps possible outcomes

The game has all the main ingredients of $P \neq NP$. If complete input (either natural number or parity) is provided it is easy to do $3n+1$ encoding

(subsection 2.5). If input is not fully defined the only technique for finding natural number/parity pair is exhaustive search. That exhaustive search is exponential in nature (table 4). On the other hand if match is found it is easy to verify that because complete input is now known.

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- [24] <http://dakhilalian.iut.ac.ir/pdf/C26.pdf>

A Sharatz.h listing

Here is an application of the principles argued in the paper. Using features mentioned in subsection 4.1 the program outputs a random stream. The program is a variant of MAG 2. The latest known cryptanalysis of MAG family with all details is presented here [24] including review of published pseudo attack.

The function accepts seed and desired length of the stream. The produced stream is directed to standard output and can be piped or saved to the file.

Listing 1: sharatz.h

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

typedef enum { OK = 0, FAIL = 1} sarac_return;

typedef char seed_sequence;//max 8k

sarac_return sarac
(const seed_sequence * sarac_seed, uint64_t sarac_byte_len)
{
    int i, j, seed_len;
    int rounds = 4;

    uint64_t mixer = 6148914691236517205;
    uint64_t ignite[1026];
    uint64_t carry = 1234567890123456789;
    uint64_t ying[512], yang[512];
    uint64_t carry_a, carry_b;
    uint64_t data_block, k;
```

```

uint64_t output;

for(i = 0; i < 1026; i++)
    ignite[i] = 0;

seed_len = strlen(sarac_seed);

if(seed_len > 8 * 1026)
    seed_len = 8 * 1026;

memcpy(ignite, sarac_seed, seed_len);

for(i = 0; i < rounds; i++)
{
    for(j = 0; j < 1026; j++)
    {
        if(ignite[(j+2)%1026]>ignite[(j+3)%1026])
            carry ^= ignite[(j+1)%1026];
        else
            carry ^= ~ignite[(j+1)%1026];

        ignite[j] ^= carry;
        carry += mixer;
    }
}

for(i = 0; i < 512; i++)
    ying[i] = ignite[i];

for(i = 0; i < 512; i++)
    yang[i] = ignite[i+512];

carry_a = ignite[1024];
carry_b = ignite[1025];

data_block = sarac_byte_len / 8 ;
if((sarac_byte_len % 8) > 0)
    data_block++;

for(k = 0; k < data_block; k++)
{
    if(ying[(k+2)%512]>ying[(k+3)%512])
        carry_a ^= ying[(k+1)%512];
    else
        carry_a ^= ~ying[(k+1)%512];
}

```

```

        ying[k%512] ^= carry_a;

        if (yang[(k+2)%512]>yang[(k+3)%512])
            carry_b ^= yang[(k+1)%512];
        else
            carry_b ^= ~yang[(k+1)%512];

        yang[k%512] ^= carry_b;

        output = ying[k%512] ^ yang[k%512];

        fwrite(&output, sizeof(output),1,stdout);
    }

    return OK;
}

```

Listing 1: sharatz.h